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Implications of legal scrutiny processes
(including the L’Aquila trial and other recent
court cases) for future volcanic risk governance
Richard J Bretton1*, Joachim Gottsmann1, Willy P Aspinall1 and Ryerson Christie2
Abstract
Discourse about the L’Aquila trial in Italy has overlooked the many different roles that laws play within risk governance.
For volcanic risk governance, laws not only create the duty holders, beneficiaries and the relationships between them
(the stakeholders) and the duties and rights (the stakes) but also dictate the acceptable standards of safety and
wellbeing (the ultimate rewards).
Within any legal regime, certain court cases will attract a high public profile. They can serve a very helpful role by
opening the black box of societal risk management so that robust and candid scrutiny of the past can lead to
better management of the future. With such cases, the goal of the competent observer is to advance beyond
debate about contested factual details of the past (the noise of what happened) and, by process of induction, to
identify wider issues of principle and precedent upon which to make reasoned improvements (the signal to
guide what should happen differently in the future and why).
The generic characteristics of law-based regulatory regimes are identified because they can be treated as ‘constants’
which do not change, or do so only very slowly over time. Accordingly, these aspects are highly relevant to long-term
risk governance. More ephemeral case-specific factual issues often remain contested and, accordingly, receive less
attention here. Significant recent court cases, including L’Aquila, are framed by process of deduction within a
generalised legal infrastructure in order to identify the root causes of the apparent status quo of risk governance.
This forensic approach is vital not only to identify the legal responsibilities of societal risk managers and the managerial
risks that they face and their causes but also to consider possible mitigation strategies.
We identify the critical issue of managerial risk vulnerability related to ‘standard equivocality’ which is the absence of
commonly recognised standards for hazard communications to risk decision makers. This absence may result
from the lack of regulation of relevant practices and practitioners. We offer some recommendations to fuel
debate not only within those science groups that reacted to the L’Aquila case but also the scientific community
as a whole. Finally, we argue that checklists represent a rational and methodical way to develop acceptable
practice standards focussed upon the difficult risk mitigation choices that are made by civil protection authorities
and at-risk individuals.
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Introduction
The discourse about the L’Aquila trial warrants careful
reflection and addition. To some commentators the trial
is “highly controversial” whilst to others it is better
described as “so-called” (Alexander 2014a, Alexander
2014b; Cartlidge 2015; Fioritto 2014; Gabrielli and Di
Bucci 2014; Lauta 2014a, 2014b; Notaro 2014; Simoncini
2014). To date, the discourse has generally been con-
fined narrowly to a single criminal case isolated from its
wider governance context. The predominant focus has
been upon the trial process and the prosecutor’s allega-
tions about past practices. This paper refers to, and
builds upon, recent initiatives to learn from the event.
By framing the trial in a wider context, it is linked to the
processes of societal and managerial risk governance for
the purpose of enabling future risk managers to change
their practices and avoid similar difficulties.
We describe the structural constants of a generalised
legal infrastructure. Framed within that infrastructure,
recent cases including L’Aquila are used to identify those
parts of a social risk governance process that lead to
managerial risks.
The L’Aquila case was the prime catalyst for our
research and its role should not be misunderstood or
overstated. Our focus is on the implications of legal pro-
cesses that involve detailed analysis of the practices of
scientists at work and not the disputed detail and merits
of particular cases. In relation to L’Aquila, this paper
therefore deliberately attempts to avoid all controversial
issues regarding the characteristics of the Italian criminal
justice system, the merits of and motivations behind the
prosecution, the alleged roles and culpabilities of the
defendants, the sentences and penalties imposed at trial,
the outcome of the appeals and the initial reactions of
many scientific communities.
No attempt is made to duplicate the institutional
dimension considered by Scolobig et al. (2014) and the
helpful distinction they make between framing emer-
gency problems in terms of public safety rather than
public control. In support of this distinction, it is worth
noting that the stated aim of most, if not all, legal re-
gimes regulating the risks of natural hazards is safety
and not control. By way of illustration, in Japan, the
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act 1997 expressly
states an objective of protecting the national territory,
the life and limb of citizens and their property. In
Indonesia, the stated aim of Disaster Management Law
24/2007 is providing protection for life and livelihood
including protection against disasters in order to attain
public welfare.
We describe how laws shape and support societal risk
governance and analyse the material aspects of recent
court cases. We argue that managerial risks, just like
societal risks, must be assessed for the purpose of ascer-
taining what measures, if any, are required for their miti-
gation. It is our hope that this paper will assist
managerial risk assessments by identifying: (1) duty
holders (exposures); (2) societal risk non-compliance
(vulnerabilities); and (3) risk mitigation strategies. Table 1
summarises a common approach to the governance of
societal and managerial risks in the context of volcanic
hazards.
Laws provide the essential infrastructure of risk govern-
ance (the governance playing field), define the duty and
rights holders and the relationships between them (the
players, the positions and dimensions of the goals, and the
rules of the game) and the empowered regulators (the
referees with red and yellow cards).
The generic characteristics of law-backed regulatory
regimes are identified because they can be treated as
‘constants’. They are formal, persistent and predictable
(Wilkinson 2013) changing only slowly over time.
Accordingly they are highly relevant to risk manage-
ment, the paramount purpose of which is to manage the
Table 1 The variables of societal and managerial risks in relation to volcanic hazards
Societal risks Managerial risks
Hazards A wide range of scenarios including ash fall, lavaflows, lahars,
earthquakes, pyroclastic flows etc. that represent volcanic hazards.
Each societal hazard can be characterised by dynamic temporal,
physical and spatial parameters.
The governance of the societal risks of volcanic hazards.
Managerial hazards have dynamic parameters related to active
regulation/scrutiny:
• Temporal (frequency)
• Spatial (reach)
• Intensity (nature & degree)
Exposure People and assets within the spatial boundaries ofthe hazard
in question.
Entities and individuals who are duty holders in law in respect of
the governance of societal risks.
Vulnerability The susceptibility of the exposed people/assets to the physical
characteristics of the volcanic hazardin question and the resulting
consequences (i.e. death, injury or damage).
Any situation which represents a failure to fulfil a societal risk duty
of care (a non-compliance) and the consequences of non-
compliance including, but not limited to, ‘naming-and-shaming’,
public scrutiny and criminal & civil law sanctions.
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future. Case-specific factual issues, which are in effect
past ‘variables’, receive less attention because: (1) often
they are and will continue to be disputed and controver-
sial; and (2) they are likely to represent an unreliable
basis for the design and management of the future
unless very similar facts are presented in the same juris-
diction. The roles, constants and variables, referred to
above, are illustrated in a generalised legal infrastructure
in Fig. 1.
The facts of an individual court case are invariably in-
teresting as they offer a snapshot of the past. However,
they remain largely irrelevant to any forensic analysis of
the legal scrutiny process itself and the subsequent iden-
tification and consideration of its constituent parts.
Adopting a counterfactual approach, the facts, whether
they are agreed or disputed, represent only one realisation
of what could have happened (Woo 2010, 2011, 2015).
We adopt a working assumption that there is a per-
ception in many scientific communities that, for a num-
ber of reasons, managerial risks are increasing. Social
science discourses are used to discuss the possible
consequences of these perceptions upon managerial risk
behaviours, including those of “Getting Better” and
“Getting Smarter”, and to consider possible managerial
risk mitigation options.
General approach, terminology and methodology
General approach
Firstly, in an ‘Observations’ section we provide a very
brief summary of selected aspects of the L’Aquila case.
For reasons that are explained, a wholly neutral de-
scription has been attempted. A number of other recent
court cases are also briefly described and framed within
the generalised legal infrastructure illustrated in Fig. 1.
In a section entitled ‘Discussion: Laws - What roles
do they fulfil?’, we provide an overview of the role of
laws in the governance of natural hazards with par-
ticular reference to the governance of future volcanic
risks.
In the next section, ‘The implications of the observa-
tions’, we refer to the profound implications of the
observed court cases and describe the fundamental regu-
latory function of court cases and in particular the influ-
ence of legal liability on societal risk governance.
Lastly, in a ‘Recommendations’ section, we consider
the issue of ‘professionalism’ and identify the absence
of regulation and the significance of ‘standard equivo-
cality’. We review steps that may represent the earlier
stages of informal (i.e. unregulated) ‘collective organ-
isation’ before linking a number of recommendations
to specific aspects of the legal scrutiny process.
Terminology
Risk governance
While governance is a complex concept that is sub-
ject to varying definitions (Power 2007; Renn 2008;
International Risk Governance Council IRGC 2005,
2007, 2009), it is generally accepted that it encom-
passes an array of organisations, practices and ideas
Fig. 1 The many roles of law in the governance of natural hazards set out in a generalised legal framework with reference to some recent
court cases
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(Rothstein et al. 2012) which change over time. The
following definition is embraced.
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals
and institutions, public and private, manage their
common affairs. It is a continuing process through
which conflicting or diverse interests may be
accommodated and co-operative action may be taken.
It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered
to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements
that people and institutions either have agreed to or
perceive to be in their interest (Commission on Global
Governance 1995).
Risk governance includes all attempts to manage
the three constituent variables of risk including steps
to mitigate volcanic hazards (there are very few suc-
cessful examples of this), to reduce the exposure of
people, assets etc. and to reduce their vulnerability
when exposed. This expression is adopted not only as
an analytic term to describe a web of actors and activ-
ities but also for ‘normative’ purposes. Risk govern-
ance has a set of definable ‘good’ qualities which
provide for the effective integration of the key com-
ponents of how risks are handled by risk stakeholders
(Walker et al. 2010), 12; International Risk Governance
Council IRGC 2009a).
Societal and Managerial risks
A distinction is made here between the management of:
(1) first order ‘societal risks’ faced by citizens; and (2)
second-order risks to the legitimacy of societal risk
managers and their “rules and methods of decision
making” as a result of internal and external control,
scrutiny and accountability which we call ‘managerial
risks’ (Power 2007).
Reflecting the “extent to which regulation is itself
subject to regulation”, managerial risks are diverse
and include “reputational risks, legal liability and
risks of failing to meet performance [political and
spending] targets” (Power 2007). They have been de-
scribed in terms of a pervasive fear of the possible
negative consequences of being responsible and an-
swerable; of being required to produce decidability in
the face of the un-decidable (Power 2007). Rothstein et al.
(2012) refer to the difficulties for decision makers caused
by the “fear of public pillory”.
The class of regulators, quasi-regulators and scruti-
neers includes governments, the law, organised inter-
est groups, the press and media (both mass and
social) and the public. Regulators are invariably given
very extensive investigatory powers and, in many ju-
risdictions, scrutineers are assisted by wide ranging
Freedom of Information laws. They are likely to have
a range of different perceptions of and approaches to
risk assessment and management.
In this paper managerial risks faced by individuals are
called ‘professional risks’ and those faced by government
bodies and other entities ‘institutional risks’.
Blame, blame-risks and blame-related behaviours
Hood (2011) notes the expression ‘managerial risks’ does
not have a clearly established meaning and adopts the
expression ‘blame risk’ identifying at least two compo-
nents of blame, which is the act of attributing something
considered to be bad or wrong to some person or entity.
The first is “some element of perceived and avoidable
harm or loss – something is seen as worse for some per-
son or group than it could have been if matters had been
handled differently.” The second is “some attribution of
agency – that harm was avoidable because it was caused
by the omission or commission by some identifiable in-
dividual or organisation.” Both of these components can
vary according to the point in time when avoidable loss/
harm and agency/responsibility are perceived. As a social
process, ‘blaming’ must involve at least two sets of ac-
tors, namely blame makers (those who do the blaming)
and blame takers (those who are on the receiving end).
Hood (2011) notes “Professionals will care about blame if
they think it will diminish their reputations in ways that
could damage their careers or produce expensive lawsuits
over malpractice.”
For Felstiner et al. (1980) blaming - what they call
‘naming’ - is a necessary precursor for ‘claiming’ in
the sense of seeking some remedy from the individual
or entity held to be responsible. The claiming can
range from demands for explanation to monetary
compensation, the resignation or dismissal of those
who are culpable or official expressions of sorrow
ranging from corporate apologies or more or less
drastic acts of contrition by individual officeholders
(Hood 2011).
It has been said that “the more closely we are
watched, the better we behave” and that this “indisput-
able truth…is one of the corner-stones of political
science” (Bentham and Quinn 2001). Three ways of
behaving better, or at least differently, as a reaction to
real and/or perceived managerial risk increases, are
“Get Better” at societal risk management, “Get Smarter” at
managerial risk management or “Get a Lawyer” 1(Hood
1986, Hood 2001; Rothstein et al. 2006).
Hood (2011) identifies three types of blame-avoidance
strategy. One is ‘policy strategies’, which is the selection
of policies and operating routines to minimise risk of
individual or institutional liability or blame. Variants of
‘policy strategies’ include: (1) ‘individualisation’ in
which the ‘agency’ dimension of blame, to which we
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have already referred, is shifted rather than reduced or
prevented; (2) ‘protocolisation’ or “playing it by the
book”, and (3) ‘abstinence’ or ‘just say no’, in other
words, choosing not to provide the services that attract
blame or have the potential to do so. Later, we will give
relevant examples of all three.
Standard equivocality
Throughout this paper, reference will be made to
‘standard equivocality’ (Rothstein 2002; Hood 1986).
This is the absence of commonly recognised standards
(norms) capable of guiding, measuring and evolving
acceptable practice.
Methodology
Law
We undertook a detailed review of legislation in a repre-
sentative sample of jurisdictions that host active volca-
nos. This simple methodology was adopted to create a
generalised legal infrastructure that can be applied read-
ily to any regulatory regime that relies upon a legal and
administrative infrastructure with duties and rights sup-
ported by scrutiny arrangements to enforce and protect
them. Recent court cases were thereafter reviewed to
enable their framing within that infrastructure.
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we have not
attempted to show all the legal sources that contributed
to the creation of the generalised legal infrastructure,
referred to above. Five ‘Additional files’ are used which
contain a small number of selected legislative provisions
that illustrate the general principles we wish to identify
and describe.
Risk governance
Risk issues are handled separately and differently. Since
the early 1980′s a linear model (also described as either
technocratic or Red Book) has been used for the
governance of many societal risks (NRC 1983, 1996;
Renn 2008). This model, which is criticised by many
authors (e.g. Fischer 2000; Pielke 2004; Donovan &
Oppenheimer 2012), starts with the characterisation of
hazard, proceeds to the integration of that variable with
societal variables of exposure and vulnerability, and
culminates in risk management decisions. In the ab-
sence of the general acceptance of a better model, such
as the more cyclical, iterative, transparent and inclusive
model advocated by some commentators (e.g. Eden
1998; Fischer 2000, Fischer 2010, Renn 2008; Brown
2009, Jasanoff 2005; Donovan 2014) we suggest that the
same 1980's linear approach can and should be used for
the governance of managerial risks.
An analogue for the probability of the onset of a
societal hazard (i.e. for the likelihood of an explosive
eruption of a volcano) might be the probability of a
regulator or regulatory process scrutinising a duty
holder’s standards of societal risk governance. We sug-
gest that this parameter is changing as the likelihood of
scrutiny is increasing. Recent cases may also indicate
that the reach and intensity of scrutiny may also be in-
creasing encouraged by a move towards more open and
transparent governance styles in many jurisdictions.
We draw an analogy between the ‘exposure’ condition
of societal risks, caused by the spatial and physical
parameters of a natural hazard and often delineated in
societal risk maps, and the ‘exposure’ condition of
managerial risks, caused by the characteristics of the
managerial hazards and in particular the ‘spatial’ reach
of the long arm of the law within a legal infrastructure.
People situated in a societal risk zone are exposed and,
as a consequence, their vulnerability to the natural
hazard in question becomes relevant and has to be
assessed. By using a generalised legal infrastructure,
societal risk duty holders can be readily identified. They
are the entities and individuals exposed to the circum-
stance (the governance of societal risks) that causes
managerial risks. Entities that are not duty holders in
law have no enforceable responsibilities and, accordingly,
are not exposed.2 Adopting the same systematic ap-
proach to both societal and managerial risks, as all duty
holders in law are exposed per se, the next step is to
assess their vulnerabilities. This involves a robust and
candid assessment of the extent to which societal risk
duties of care have been fulfilled. We discuss the difficul-
ties of achieving and maintaining societal risk compli-
ance later.
In summary, managerial risks, just like societal risks,
must be assessed for the purpose of ascertaining what
measures, if any, are required for their mitigation. Table 1
summarises commonalities in the governance of societal
and managerial risks in the context of volcanic hazards.
Observations
Six cases are referred to below and, for ease of reference,
they are listed in Table 2 and illustrated in Fig. 1. In both
Table 2 and Fig. 1 national cases are shown in blue;
international in red.
The L’Aquila case
On 6 April 2009 at about 03:32 Central European Time,
a 6.3 Mw earthquake occurred near L’Aquila, Italy
resulting in over 300 fatalities, over 1,500 injured
people and approximately 20,000 buildings being
rendered uninhabitable. A related legal process, de-
scribed by Lauta (2014a) as “a spectacular penal case”,
opened up the Black Box3 (Latour 1987) of societal risk
management and scrutinised at length the behaviour of
a number of officials, most of whom were scientists
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(Alexander 2014a). It was alleged that the defendants
were members of the Commissione Nazionale per la
Previsione e Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi (CGR)
tasked to assess major risks and to inform that deci-
sion making process and the public of these risks
(Lauta 2014b). They were indicted for and found
guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Lengthy prison
sentences and large financial penalties were handed
down at the first instance trial. Appeals against both
conviction and sentence were pursued by all the de-
fendants. Six were acquitted and the sentence of the
sole convicted defendant was reduced.
Some of the actual details of the L’Aquila tragedy
and case can be found elsewhere (Alexander 2014a,
Alexander 2014b; Gabrielli & Di Bucci 2014; Scolobig
et al. 2014; Lauta 2014a; Lauta 2014b; Simoncini
2014; Notaro 2014; Fioritto 2014). However, as some
‘published facts’ are still contested, detailed discussion
of such issues is deliberately omitted here to avoid
distraction from our main theme.
The L’Aquila case concerned an alleged breach of
a national law4 imposing a criminal law duty of care.
Purportedly the trial was about the alleged consequences
of public officials (duty holders) misleading the public
(rights holders) with incomplete, imprecise and contra-
dictory information (Alexander 2014a). As a matter of
legal logic, the trial judge must have made in respect to
all seven defendants; (1) a finding of law that the duty
holders had a legal duty of care to provide to the public
information that was “complete”, “precise” and “clear”;
(2) a finding of fact that, in breach of this duty, that they
did not; and (3) a finding of factual causation that this
breach led to losses of life. On appeal, this reasoning
was clearly upheld in respect of the sole remaining con-
victed defendant.
Other recent court cases in context
In the case of Garcés in Chile in December 2013, the
Chilean Supreme Court ordered state institutions (duty
holders) to pay compensation to several claimants
(rights holders) for breach a national law that imposed a
civil law duty of care (Duffield 2013; Trujillo 2013).
Garcés case, Chile
Mario Segundo Ovando Garcés was a resident of
Santa Clara, Talcahuano. On 27 February 2010, in
the wake of 8.8 magnitude earthquake, he heard the
Regional Governor dispel the risk of a tsunami on a
local radio station and decided not to evacuate his
home. 20 minutes later a tsunami killed Mario and
over 300 other people.
The Chilean Navy runs the Hydrographic and
Oceanographic Service (SHOA). SHOA admitted
after the tsunami that it had made errors and given
unclear information to government officials who
issued an alert, withdrew it, only to reissue it after
the event. The Supreme Court of Chile held
government agencies responsible for Mario’s death
and awarded his dependants over US$ 55,000
compensation.
In a criminal law prosecution relating to the same
tsunami, Chile’s National Prosecutor’s office is prosecuting,
for involuntary manslaughter and other less serious
offences, seven public officials including Carmen Fernández,
a former director of the National Emergency Agency, and
Patricio Rosende, a former Under-Secretary of the Interior
(Bonnefoy 2013).
Nineteen people died in the volcanic eruption of
Soufriere Hills, Montserrat on 25 June 1997. In 1997
Montserrat was a British Dependent Territory (now an
Overseas Territory) and the British government had
ultimate responsibility for the island’s welfare. In late
1998 an inquest concerning those deaths was held by a
Coroner sitting with five jurors. It heard evidence from
52 witnesses over a period of 2 months. An inquest is a
judicial enquiry into sudden or unexplained causes of
death and is required to make findings of fact regarding,
inter alia, the injury causing each death and the circum-
stances in which that injury was sustained. (Montserrat
1998, 1999; Section 12 Coroner's Act 1950).
Table 2 List and details of selected cases
Country Name Type of case Duty holders
Italy L’Aquila National -Criminal Individuals (Public officials)
Chile Fernandez et al. National -Criminal Individuals (Public officials
Chile Garces National -Civil Government agency
Montserrat Soufriere Hills National -Fatal inquiry (Inquest) Government agencies
New Zealand Raoul Island National -Fatal inquiry Government agencies
Russia Budayeva International -Human rights State
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Sonfriere Hills Inquest, Montserrat
In all 19 deaths, the jury decided that the cause of
death was “the natural catastrophe of volcanic
eruption/pyroclastic flow”.
The evidence established that people had returned to
their homes in an Exclusion Zone to avoid deplorable
conditions in public shelters. Many of the people killed
were farmers who had returned to visit, live or work in
the Exclusion Zone despite widespread knowledge that
it was unsafe. They were caught in and could not
escape from a sudden surge/eruption of pyroclastic
flow. A recorded contributory cause of 9 deaths was
the failure of the authorities (both local and British) to
provide alternative lands in safe areas for farmers
displaced from the Exclusion Zone. For 4 other deaths,
it was the continued operation of the airport despite
elevated volcanic activity in the days immediately
preceding the 25 June eruption. In 1 case, the jury
stated conditions in the public shelters were so
deplorable that the deceased had refused to return to
them after his initial experience.
One of the functions of an Inquest (Section 12,
Coroner’s Act 1950) is to make recommendations to
appropriate authorities to assist in the avoidance in
future of circumstances which may be prejudicial to
the health or safety of the public. The Coroner made a
number of recommendations about the need for more
permanent affordable housing for about 400 people in
overcrowded shared accommodation and many more
in involuntary exile overseas. The British government’s
response, over 40 months after the start of the crisis,
was described as pathetic, unimaginative, grudging
and tardy. Recommendations were also made
regarding deplorable conditions in public shelters and
ways of improving the provision of risk information to
members of the public.
New Zealand offers a very good example of a post facto
regulatory investigation following a fatality on Raoul
Island (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation &
Employment website).
Raoul Island Fatal Inquiry, New Zealand
In March 2006 a ranger employed by the NZ
Department of Conservation was killed whilst taking
samples from Raoul Island’s crater-lake. The volcano
suddenly and violently erupted and the water level of
the lake rose 4 m as a result. New Zealand’s relevant
regulator, the Department of Labour, investigated the
incident and in particular the actions of two duty
holders, namely the deceased’s employer, the Department
of Conservation (DOC), and the Institute of Geological
and Nuclear Science (IGNS) which had been contracted
to carry out scientific monitoring work.
No criticism was made of the duty holders but the
regulator recommended that the duty holders improve
the safety aspects of scientific monitoring and
investigate the automated monitoring of high
risk locations.
In the absence of relevant national laws, or when na-
tional laws are inadequate, ineffective or unenforced,
there is room for the intervention of international law.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
taken the lead and we suggest here that in time the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights will follow. The
European Convention of Human Rights (EConHR) lays
down a positive obligation on States to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of citizens within their juris-
diction. Article 2 (1) EConHR provides that “Everyone’s
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of
a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime
for which this penalty is provided by law”.
In the context of the management of natural haz-
ards, the most important case involving Article 2
arose in 2008. Budayeva and others v Russia (2008)
ECHR 15339/02 concerned a mudslide. In this case
the EHCR considered principles which had been ap-
plied in Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) to a man-made
hazard - an industrial risk or dangerous activity such as
the operation of a waste site. They were subsequently
adopted in Kolyadenko & others v Russia (2012) in respect
natural flash floods.
Budayeva and others v Russia
The town of T was situated in a mountain district.
Two tributaries passed through it and were known
to have associated mudslides. A mud collector and a
dam were constructed in order to protect T. The dam
was seriously damaged by a mud and debris flow in
August 1999, so funds were requested to construct
observation posts to warn of mudslides until it could
be repaired, and to carry out certain emergency works
to the dam.
Those measures were never implemented. A number
of mudslides occurred in July 2000, killing eight
residents, including the first applicant’s husband,
and destroying the applicants’ homes.
It was decided to dispense with a criminal
investigation into the circumstances of the death
of the first applicant’s husband, and claims of
compensation by the first applicant and others were
refused on the basis that a mudslide of such
exceptional force could neither have been predicted
nor stopped. However, the applicants were granted
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 7 of 24
substitute housing and a lump-sum emergency
allowance.
The applicants complained to the ECHR, inter alia,
that the authorities had violated the substantive limb
of Article 2 of the EConHR. The first applicant
asserted that the authorities were responsible for the
death of her husband and she and the other
applicants asserted that the authorities had failed to
take appropriate measures to mitigate the risks to
their lives posed by natural hazards.
The Court concluded that the relevant authorities
were aware of the mudslides (the hazards) and their
capacity to cause devastating consequences (the risks).
There was no ambiguity about the scope and timing of
the work that needed to be performed (the risk
mitigation actions). After 1999, risk mitigation was not
given proper consideration by the decision makers and
budgetary bodies (the duty holders) and there was no
functioning early warning system. State responsibility
for the deaths had never been investigated. Each
applicant was awarded compensation.
The EHCR determined that the obligation in Article 2
entails, above all, a primary duty on the State to put in
place a clear legislative and administrative framework
designed to provide effective deterrence against threats
to the right to life. It applies in the context of any
activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life
may be at stake and extends not only to industrial risks
and dangerous activities but also actions and omissions
to control natural hazards.
In cases of Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004), Budayeva v
Russia (2008), and Kolyadenko and others v Russia
(2012), to which we have already referred, and also Kats
& others v Ukraine (2008) and Rantsev v Cyprus &
Russia (2010) the EHCR determined that there is a posi-
tive obligation: (1) ex-ante to take substantive regulatory
measures to manage risks; and (2) ex-post facto to en-
sure that any risk eventuated fatalities are followed by a
public investigation. In relation to the later, procedures
must exist for identifying not only shortcomings in the
ex-ante regulatory measures but also any errors commit-
ted by those responsible (i.e. duty holders). If there are
any shortcomings and the infringement of the right to
life was not intentional, it is not necessary for criminal
proceedings to be brought in every case. It may satisfac-
tory to make available to the victims civil law remedies
(either alone or in conjunction with a criminal law rem-
edy) enabling any responsibility of the parties concerned
to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such
as an order for the payment of damages, to be obtained.
The positive obligations of EConHR State duty holders
under the ECHR are summarised in Fig. 2.
Other cases (Guerra v Italy 1998, Vilnes v Norway
2013) have relied upon the ECHR Article 8 right of an
individual to respect for their private life. It has been
determined that there is a positive obligation for States
to “provide access to” essential information enabling
individuals to assess risks to their health and safety. That
obligation might in certain circumstances also encom-
pass a duty actually to ‘provide’ such information.
Fig. 2 The obligations of EConHR ‘States’ to manage natural hazards
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 8 of 24
Discussion: Laws – What roles do they fulfil?
Making natural hazards, such as volcanos, the formal
subject of risk governance
As we recognise in this paper that risk is multi-variate,
being the convolution of variables of hazard, exposure
and vulnerability, it follows that volcanic hazards only
become volcanic risks, properly so called, with the
existence of social exposures and vulnerabilities. The
three variables are convolved because they are, to
some extent, concomitant and ‘mutually conditioning’
(Bankoff et al. 2004, 38).
Many risks are, in whole or in part, recurring social
manifestations (i.e. human-made phenomena) with
negative consequences (Lauta 2014a; Lauta 2014b). In
many cultures, particularly western cultures, they are
no longer perceived as the consequences of external
forces occurring independently of society (in other
words, events that are either divine or inherent in
nature) and being insusceptible to mitigation by society.
Accordingly, they are now positioned within, and have
become the responsibility of, the institutions and stake-
holders of relevant social communities (Lauta 2014a;
Lauta 2014b). These human-made risks are perceived
to be susceptible to regulation with the objective of
achieving their effective mitigation. In this context,
regulation is formal, structured and active management
pursuant to primary and secondary laws. By way of
illustration, the population of Naples has greatly in-
creased since 1944 and many would argue that the
resulting increase in volcanic risk exposure is human-
made and capable of regulation.
Low probability-high impact risks pose a particular
challenge for legislators. In fact there are three related
challenges, namely scientific uncertainty, a low likeli-
hood of occurrence and significant societal conse-
quences. Whilst the elevated consequences of these
risk call for some level of regulation, the intrinsic un-
certainty and low probability of their occurrence
makes it difficult to review the evidentiary scientific
justification, to assess costs and benefits and to iden-
tify the means by which the goals can be pursued
(Simoncini 2013).
In the absence of a tragedy, it is difficult to measure
the performance of law-backed societal risk governance
by the usual measures of: (1) economy (e.g. value for
money) for input and process; (2) efficiency (e.g. quality
delivered on time) for process and output; and (3) effect-
iveness for output and outcome. The indicators of out-
come (the intended and unintended results) of the
integrated governance system will be related to the im-
pacts on and the consequences for public good, safety, se-
curity, health and welfare but it will be a challenge for any
related targets (e.g. benchmarks and performance stan-
dards) to be SMART - Specific, Measurable, Achievable,
Relevant and Timed (OECD Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development 2002; OECD et al. 2002;
Basher 2006).
By contrast, in a fact-finding process of scrutiny after
a tragedy, the use of SMART targets may become more
practicable. It may be possible to measure hazard char-
acterisation outputs against planned targets for timely
delivery, user-friendliness, outcome-focus and tem-
poral/spatial/intensity forecast accuracy. Based upon
findings of fact, it may be feasible to quantify the
resulting risk-mitigation impact measured in lives and
assets saved.
Notwithstanding these challenges, many jurisdictions
have national laws that attempt to regulate the manage-
ment of risks arising from natural hazards. Many reflect
the shift in paradigm, at both international and national
levels, from focussing on post-facto, reactive response
(the phases of emergency response and post-disaster
longer term recovery) to ex-ante, pro-active risk man-
agement and mitigation (the phase of planning and
preparedness) (UN SC-DRR 2009). Although we suspect
that emergency response may still dominate thinking
and funding in some jurisdictions, these national laws
are unlikely to diminish in number and/or reach in the
light of: (1) the emerging international law governance
norms to which we have already referred; (2) the IFRC
and UN law checklist, to which we will refer later, and
(3) the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015–30 which specifically prioritises prevention be-
fore response and recovery (International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IFRC and
United Nations Development Programme 2015, 9;
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster UN/
ISDR 2015).
The creation of risk governance infrastructures
As illustrated in Fig. 1, national laws tend to identify,
authorise and fund5 risk governance bodies (e.g. govern-
ment departments & agencies, public corporations) and
public officials (e.g. individuals such governors, mayors,
prefects & village heads) within a coherent legal and
administrative framework, in other words, a risk govern-
ance infrastructure. These laws often use and build upon
existing entities within existing administrative frame-
works that have multi-level national, regional, district,
municipal etc. political divisions and subdivisions.
In some jurisdictions, formal legal infrastructures
anticipate and rely upon less formal structures and rela-
tionships at a local level near at-risk communities. For
example, in Ecuador the risk governance infrastructure
relies upon the engagement and commitment of local
representatives (e.g. chiefs and elders) and volunteers,
such as hazard wardens/monitors, for both hazard data
gathering and risk mitigation.
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In some jurisdictions, such as Italy, laws favour the
imposition of duties upon individuals rather than imper-
sonal legal entities such as government departments/
agencies and public companies. Legal duties may be
founded upon an individual having effective decision-
making powers and control over financial resources
rather than upon an individual holding a particular title
or occupying a particular post (Bergman et al. 2007).
These infrastructures can be complex, confusing,
fragmented and multi-level. They are often the crea-
tions of multiple sets of national primary (enabling)
and secondary (detailed implementing) legislation sup-
plemented as necessary by further provisions at minis-
terial, inter-ministerial, regional, provincial and local
levels of government. An additional file shows this in
more detail [see Additional file 1].
Occasionally additional specialised bodies are estab-
lished (e.g. emergency management agencies, research/
monitoring institutes and volcano observatories) with
the creation of statutory roles to be filled by appointed
individuals. An additional file shows this in more detail
[see Additional file 2].
The creation of duty holders, duties of care
and rights holders
National laws allocate to bodies and individuals (duty
holders) high level management functions with respon-
sibilities (duties of care) which are owed to the particu-
lar classes of people for whose benefit the duties were
created (rights holders). In some jurisdictions, general
disaster management obligations are also imposed on
‘the community’ (i.e. members of the public) and busi-
ness institutions. During the course of an emerging
period of hazard unrest, the relevant duty holders may
change as defined duties are transferred from one duty
holder to another - sometimes as a result of changing
hazard or risk characterisations. These duties of care
can be framed in a wide variety of ways. They may re-
late to general health and safety not specifying any risk
creator (a particular hazard, natural or otherwise) or
may be more specific identifying a particular hazard
(flooding, earthquakes etc.).
Rights holders may be given the right to a safe and
healthy environment, and to be represented, con-
sulted or engaged in risk decisions and/or given infor-
mation. Additional rights may be given to certain
categories of persons due to special vulnerabilities
and/or the influence of social structures and prac-
tices. These categories may include women, the very
poor, older persons, children and people with disabil-
ities (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies IFRC and United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2015).
An additional file shows this in more detail [see
Additional file 3].
There are two main types of duty of care which are
called here respectively ‘functional’ and ‘goal-setting’.
Functional duties dictate the fulfilment of a particular
role (e.g. a duty to undertake monitoring, to prepare
plans and programmes for emergency preparedness or
to provide emergency preparedness communications
and warnings). Goal-setting duties require the achieve-
ment of an outcome (e.g. a duty to ensure the safety
and wellbeing of identified rights holders). Not even
within the highly regulated field of occupational health
are these safety goals absolute (i.e. unqualified). The
imposition of an unrealistic absolute duty would give
rights holders a theoretical guarantee of health and
safety within a risk-free environment.
As a general rule, ‘qualified’ duties of care are therefore
laid down. These duties represent democratic statements
or mandates of ‘acceptable’ or ‘optimal’ risk after miti-
gation and express a rational trade-off between safety
and risk6 (Hood & Rothstein 2001; Rothstein 2014).
Rothstein (2014) notes “After all, what is an acceptable
risk other than a euphemistic boundary between an
acceptable adverse outcome and an unacceptable fail-
ure”. Compliance with qualified duties inevitably re-
quires duties holders to perform a risk-focussed cost/
benefit analysis and a test of proportionality.7
Laws rarely, if ever, attempt to dictate, in either
general or more detailed terms, the societal risk manage-
ment arrangements that will be required to either fulfil a
functional role or achieve a stated safety outcome. In
practice, an assessment of societal vulnerability has two
main stages. Firstly, the nature and scope of duties of
care must be identified and delineated. This is essentially
a matter of law and involves the legal interpretation of
primary and secondary legislation and, if relevant, case
law. Secondly, it is necessary to identify the actions that
the duty holder should take to fulfil those duties. This is
far more difficult. Competent lawyers can describe the
safety function or outcome required in law – in football
terms the dimensions and position of the goal. However,
they can offer very limited guidance regarding the
practical measures that the competent societal risk
manager will need to take to achieve legal compliance
(i.e. how actually to get the ball over the goal line).
This general approach seems to have been adopted by
the three appeal judges in the L’Aquila appeal hearing.
It has been reported that the prosecutor attempted to
show that the defendants had flouted specific duties
imposed on them by law as members of the Commis-
sione Nazionale per la Previsione e Prevenzione Dei
Grandi Rischi but the Appeal Court judges argued that
the law was too vaguely defined to allow such an ap-
proach. Instead, they said, “the experts should have
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been judged on how well they adhered to the science
of the time” (Cartlidge 2015).
In the case of food standards and occupational health
and safety standards, it is common for national laws to
set up government agencies to carry out research, to set
performance standards and offer approved codes of
practice or authoritative guidance. By contrast in respect
of volcanic hazards, at both international and national
levels, there appear to be neither: (1) law-based perform-
ance standards offering guidance8 to societal risk man-
agers; or (2) law endorsed self-regulatory regimes such as
those that frequented the early stages of food regulation.
Within the ‘goal-setting’ legislative approach, referred
to above, it is implicit that there is an obligation on
duties holders to establish the nature and suitability (i.e.
the legal adequacy) of their societal risk management
arrangements. This difficult justification will usually be
done post-facto, in other words, only after the risk out-
come (perhaps a disaster properly so-called) is known
and legal consequences are already being considered
(Simoncini 2011). The justification will cover, but will
not be limited to, the arrangements that were necessary
for the planning, organisation, control, monitoring and
review of societal risk mitigation measures. To complete
our footballing analogy, post-facto legal processes are
analogous to slow motion TV replays, in full view of
partisan onlookers and experts with hindsight, which de-
termine what has happened, whether or not a goal has
been scored and, if not, why not and what affect any
missed goal had on the final score (i.e. whether legal
compliance has actually been achieved and, if not, why
not and what the consequences should have been if
compliance had been achieved).
‘Standard equivocality’, which is the absence of com-
monly recognised standards (norms), is likely to exist
in the absence of clear ‘legal’ requirements, approved
codes of practice or guidance. The resulting chal-
lenges faced by duty holders are: (1) to find or design
authoritative standards or benchmarks to steer their
societal risk management arrangements; and thereby
(2) increase their chances of fulfilling their societal
risk duties of care and achieving legal compliance;
and thereby (3) minimise their vulnerability to man-
agerial risks.
Rothstein (2001) and Hood (1986) have noted that,
in the absence of commonly agreed and practical
principles or methodologies by which compliance can
be measured (‘standard-unequivocality’), process com-
pliance is difficult to monitor and process non-
compliance is difficult to enforce. Other obstacles to
monitoring, surveillance and enforcement include
inherent scientific uncertainty, a dynamic state of
scientific knowledge, lack of expertise within regula-
tory agencies and often complex and fragmented
multi-level infrastructures. Donovan and Oppenheimer
(2014) notes that Possekel (1999) and Clay et al. (1999)
both identified complexities in governmental structures as
presenting major challenges for the managing volcanic
eruptions on Montserrat.
The creation of powers
Traditionally, national laws have granted defined ‘au-
thorities’ to government duty holders backed by admin-
istration, protection and intervention powers (ordinary,
extra-ordinary and emergency). Governance, with an
emphasis more on control than protection, has often
been achieved by the exercise of authority using linear
“coercion and enforcement” (Rosenau et al. 2004;
Walker et al. 2010). An additional file shows this in
more detail [see Additional file 4].
The creation of regulators, enforcement powers and
scrutiny venues
Laws often establish, resource and empower regulators
to monitor the performance of duty holders and to take
enforcement actions, including prosecutions, against
them, if necessary. Examples of regulators include the
Labour Standards Agency in Japan, the Department of
Labour Health and Safety Service in New Zealand and
the Occupational Safety and Health Agency in the
United States of America. These regulators often have
very wide powers similar to and sometimes exceeding
those of police forces. They include the power to enter
premises, to investigate and inspect, to acquire and pre-
serve evidence and to serve notices.
Laws provide the formal scrutiny venues (courts,
tribunals etc.) and related procedures for: (1) the ex-ante
pro-active enforcement of duties of care by regulators,
generally health and safety agencies; and (2) the ex-post
facto reactive scrutiny of events, the identification of duty
holders, the assessment of what happened and what
should have happened and, if appropriate, the imposition
of sanctions and/or the granting of remedies. The later
procedures are required at a national level to comply with
the international law ex-post facto obligations in Fig. 2.
In March 2015 the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the
United Nations (UN) Development Programme issued
the pilot version of “The checklist on law and disaster
risk reduction”. It encourages accountability mecha-
nisms within legislation for failure to fulfil risk govern-
ance responsibilities. In particular it advocates laws: (1)
to establish public reporting or parliamentary oversight
mechanisms and transparency requirements for govern-
ment entities tasked with risk governance responsibil-
ities; (2) to give a mandated role to the judiciary in
enhancing accountability; (3) to provide enforceable
incentives for compliance and disincentives for non-
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compliance; and (4) to establish legal and/or administra-
tive sanctions (as appropriate) for public officials indi-
viduals and businesses for a gross (“particularly
egregious”) failure to fulfil their duties (International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IFRC and United Nations Development Programme
2015, 16).
In a few known jurisdictions (e.g. USA, Canada and
the Philippines) laws also regulate to varying degrees
the qualification, licensing and registration of geologists
and the practice of geology per se. An additional file
shows this in more detail [see Additional file 5].
Implications of the observations
Recent court cases
The implications of the six cases, in Fig. 1, are pro-
found. For natural hazards it is now clear that not only
‘national’ laws but also ‘international’ laws create duty
holders with specific risk governance obligations. The
IFRC and UN law checklist, to which we have already
referred, recognises and supports this position (Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-
eties IFRC and United Nations Development Programme
2015). It has even been said that today the development of
disaster prevention is not only a moral obligation but also
a human right (Lauta 2014a).
Tragedies resulting from natural hazards may result
in: (1) the risk of compensation payments from civil
law claims (Budayeva and Garcés); (2) the risk of penal
sanctions from criminal prosecutions (L’Aquila and
Fernandez); and/or (3) the risk of factual findings (Son-
friere Hills Montserrat and Raoul Island New Zealand
Island).
In respect of the L’Aquila trial, Lauta (2014a, 147)
argues that it reflects not only the potential collateral
damage of natural hazards becoming the subject of
societal risk management but also the resulting possi-
bility of related responsibility and politico-legal issues.
He also identifies the potential of scapegoating, the risk
of applying hindsight causality and the difficulty in pla-
cing responsibility in a complex setting of individuals
and institutions.
Lauta (2014b) notes:
The L’Aquila order is not extraordinary, medieval, or
an incident we can rightly consider an isolated
Americanised fluke – rather, it is part of the
recognition that disasters are increasingly spheres of
social control and thereby potential injustice.
Disasters form part of a contingent and violent world,
but they no longer serve as free get-out-out-of-jail-
cards from the responsibility of professional neglect.
Court cases open the Black Box of societal risk governance
As required by emerging international law, national laws
create and will continue to create rigid and permanent
infrastructures, legal and administrative frameworks,
within which societal risk governance is undertaken. In a
functioning democracy, national laws should reflect the
extent to which members of the public consider it both
practicable (feasible) and reasonable (when considered
in the context of available time and finite national,
regional and local resources) to manage the risks of nat-
ural hazards in order to safeguard the lives, livelihoods
and property of individuals and communities. Their im-
plied, if not express, aim is to achieve a rational balance
between safety and risk.
Laws create holders of duties and rights (stake-
holders) and enforceable relationships between them.
Some of these duties and relationships may be contrac-
tual (i.e. the product of voluntary negotiation) rather
than being imposed by mandatory legislation. For ex-
ample, a government agency such as a volcano observa-
tory may agree to provide at a price forecasts and data
for the private operators in the tourist or aviation sec-
tors. Between different jurisdictions international treat-
ies may create enforceable obligations to coordinate
hazard assessments and risk mitigation strategies. By
way of example, the Instituto Geofisico in Ecuador
exchanges data and coordinates hazard communica-
tions with its neighbour Colombia’s OVSP-SGC in re-
spect of Volcan Chiles-Cerro Negro.
Tribunals and related procedures, such as the post-
facto procedures set out in Fig. 2, are provided to
ensure duties are performed and rights are protected.
Legal liability plays a fundamental regulatory function.
Simoncini (Simoncini 2013, Simoncini 20149) notes the
allocation of liability not only makes possible post-facto
criminal law sanctions and civil law remedies to penal-
ise inadequate societal risk management (it creates the
stick) but also provides an ex-ante indirect incentive for
good risk management (it produces the carrot).
Lauta (2014a) identifies and attempts to address a
conflict between the functions respectively of the stick
and the carrot in distributing risk, blame and responsi-
bility fairly and expeditiously in society. He refers to the
“need to address the challenge of developing legal
systems able to facilitate the perceived injustice of the
victims of a disaster and simultaneously not to endanger
the overall societal aim of creating the most effective
disaster response system”.
Ten years ago, Aspinall & Sparks (2004) noted “the
world is becoming increasingly litigious and legal cases
involving scientists as expert witnesses, or even targets
of civil and criminal proceedings are becoming more
commonplace and more contentious”. Prophetically
they said:
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With a ‘blame culture’ growing in many societies,
volcanologists are unlikely to escape from
involvement in legal issues, since their scientific
advice can have profound implications for
governmental decisions that affect people’s lives. Such
decisions may involve matters of life and death, severe
disruption to people’s lives in a volcanic crisis, or
major costs associated with compulsory evacuations.
Court cases and other scrutiny processes open in pub-
lic the Black Box of societal risk governance. We refer to
Fig. 1 and in particular the green lined box entitled
“Actual practice to fulfil duties of care as influenced by
acceptable current practice but subject to ‘standard
equivocality’”. The post-L’Aquila discourse has over-
looked the fact that, whilst court cases may highlight
the ‘constants’ of societal risk governance, their role is
not to determine what the ‘constants’ should be. This
issue will have been determined already and is a ques-
tion of law not fact. It is, of course, accepted that weak-
nesses and related improvements may be identified
leading to long-term infrastructural changes and per-
haps the necessity of amending legislation.10
By contrast, the actual performance of the ‘constants’
(what actually happened?) is an ever changing ‘variable’.
It is question of fact and not law. It is determined at one
moment in time and compared with what was planned
and/or required by law (what should have happened?).
This variable forms the factual substance of individual
court cases and is often the subject of intense debate.
For societal risk managers, Black Box opening is a
hazard which may create managerial risks (what Hood
calls blame-risks) including public pillory and legal sanc-
tions. Recent court cases are a further reminder, albeit
for many a very unwelcome reminder, that the Black
Box of societal risk governance can be opened and in
the future will be opened again, perhaps with greater
frequency. We have already shown that in Europe (see
Budayeva v Russia) an independent and thorough inves-
tigation is now a legal requirement following natural
hazard fatalities.
We suggest here that a legal infrastructure of societal
risk governance simplifies and even encourages the iden-
tification of the blame takers and any post-tragedy
scrutiny process will readily identify and describe the
circumstances of the perceived avoidable harm. The
scene after a natural tragedy is therefore ripe for the
processes of blaming, naming and claiming, to which we
have already referred.
This growing realisation of greater scrutiny and ac-
countability, as evidenced by the public reactions of
many scientific groups to the L’Aquila case, should be
used positively as an incentive for better societal risk
management (i.e. for Getting Better). It should not be
used negatively as an excuse to undertake blame-
avoidance or blame-dissolution behaviour such as
‘defensive risk management’, a well-documented organ-
isational rationality, in order to prioritise managerial
risk management at the expense of societal risk man-
agement (i.e. for Getting Smarter) (Hood 2001, 2011;
Hood & Rothstein 2000, 2001; Rothstein et al. 2006).
Gabrielli & Di Bucci (2014) commenting directly on
the L’Aquila trial, refer to an accusatory approach that
induces a feeling of fear of possible punishment and “is
characterised by a progressive, regular adoption of
behaviours that are not aimed at better managing the
[societal] risk, but rather at attempting to minimise the
possibility to be personally involved in a future legal
controversy”.11 This appears to be a clear warning that
an accusatory approach may lead to the unintended con-
sequence of the prioritisation of professional protection
(i.e. managerial risks) before societal safety (societal
risks). We have already referred to three types of blame-
avoidance strategy identified by Hood (2011). One
variant of policy strategies is ‘abstinence’ or ‘just say no’,
in other words, choosing not to provide the services that
attract blame or have the potential to do so. This strat-
egy, expressed as the withdrawal of scientific expertise,
was predicted by most L’Aquila press statements.
Interestingly, Donovan and Oppenheimer (2014) iden-
tify a pre-L’Aquila perceived need to mitigate manage-
ment risks and refer to the anxiety of scientists
concerning their liability, which they suggests “is clear
from [Montserrat Scientific Advisory Committee] re-
ports particularly from 2002 onwards (when there
were several court cases about evacuations)”. They
argue that “the formalisation of advice into the SAC was
largely to gain greater protection, and SAC reports
contain a disclaimer, pointing to the government’s respon-
sibility for its decisions.”
One variant of Hood’s blame-avoidance policy strat-
egies is ‘protocolisation’ or “playing it by the book”.
The formalisation of advice into the Montserrat SAC
advice might be an example of this. Another policy
strategy is ‘individualisation’ in which the ‘agency’ di-
mension of blame, is shifted rather than reduced or
prevented. A disclaimer, such as that used by the
Montserrat SAC, is a device that can implement this
type of strategy.
Although the L’Aquila convictions have highlighted a
number of perceived managerial risks (both exposures
and vulnerabilities), as we have already sought to
demonstrate, no international or national legal regime
will dictate, with any degree of guiding precision, ‘what
should happen’-in other words the theoretical models
and practical policies and arrangements required for
effective hazard assessment, societal risk management
and related hazard and risk communications. In the
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presence of ‘standard equivocality’, Getting Better is far
from a straightforward response. However, we note
that, in the absence of prescribed legal rigidity, there
exists real freedom for risk managers to test different
approaches to societal risk governance (including more
complex, non-linear, multi-disciplinary and inter-
disciplinary models) such as those described within a
recent Tristan da Cunha case study (Hicks et al. 2013).
The devil (the risk of accountability and blame) there-
fore lies in the dynamic detail of what represents current
‘acceptable practice’ in the form of the ways and means
by which legal duties can actually be fulfilled by duty
holders to the required legal standard within the time
and resource constraints of dynamic practice. Simoncini
(2014) would describe these practices, which she con-
siders should be known in advance (presumably in
advance of any process of legal scrutiny) as “the ex-
pected level and nature of…performance”. Notaro
(2014) states that the L’Aquila trial judge said (at page
91 of his judgment) that the object of the CGR’s task
was expressly specified by the law (i.e. the duty of care
was clearly stated) but (at pages 823 et sqq.) he was
forced to determine exactly what type of conduct was
effectively expected of the members of the CGR to ab-
solve their duties in L’Aquila.12 We have already noted
that the L’Aquila appeal judges decided that the defen-
dants had to be judged by how well they adhered to the
science of the time i.e. current accepted scientific stan-
dards (Cartlidge 2015).
This devil ignited and continues to fuel post-L’Aquila
debate about the merits of initiatives to recognise and rec-
ord ‘practice’. Subsidiary debates are likely to revolve
around; (1) the relative merits of practice norms that are
labelled respectively ‘acceptable’, ‘good’ and ‘best’; and (2)
the critical norms that should underpin all scientific activ-
ities and deliverables with a view to making them more
relevant to and valued by civil protection authorities and
at-risk individuals. Should they be recipient-focussed,
process outcome-focussed, independent, objective, neu-
tral/unbiased, value-free, and balanced?
This is not first time that these difficult issues of
professional liability, competence and standards have
been raised (Aspinall & Sparks 2004; Aspinall 2011).
In 2004 Aspinall & Sparks (2004) commented:
What are the legal responsibilities of a volcanologist
in a crisis? What comparison can be made with
other areas of professional liability? Under what
circumstances might a volcanologist be held
accountable in court, and what standards of
scientific evidence are required…What after all
is ‘a professional geologist’ and how would one
satisfy a court as to one’s professional standards
and competence?
Recommendations
Getting Better – A Response to Black Box opening
Careful consideration should be given to mitigation
options that may be available to individuals and groups
of individuals in response to professional risks.
Regulation (external and self) and its implications
A starting point may be to revisit the status of those
geoscientists who would answer to the description of
‘volcanologists’, and to consider whether their practices
entitle them now, or rather should entitle them in the
future, to be described accurately as ‘professionals’. We
do not attempt a detailed critique of the respective
meanings of ‘profession’ and ‘professional’. Although a
wide range of meanings can be found, a number of
common features emerge. Most meanings involve an
occupation for which a person is especially suited, edu-
cated, trained or qualified. Others features include: (1)
the development of qualification standards for entry
and continuing membership; (2) the establishment or
recognition of apprenticeships, training and educa-
tional resources; (3) the introduction of codes of be-
haviour; and (4) a degree of self-regulation and/or
state regulation.
For legal purposes, it has been suggested the occupa-
tions which are regarded as professions have four charac-
teristics namely: (1) nature of work; (2) moral aspect; (3)
status; and (4) collective organisation (Powell & Stewart
2012). In relation to the first three, volcanologists under-
take skilled and specialised work which is predominantly
mental. It is assumed that they are committed to a high
standard of service for its own sake, feel committed to cer-
tain moral or ethical principles, and consider they owe a
wider duty to the community and the public at large
which may on occasions transcend the duty to a particular
stakeholder or their employer.
Scientists in many countries and cultures enjoy a
high status by common consent. Unsurprisingly, there
is a lively discourse about the importance of the status
of, and levels of confidence in, scientists and the extent
to which risk managers as a class are trusted in the
context of risk communication (Renn & Levine 1991;
Siegrist & Cvekovich 2000; Earle 2004; Haynes 2005;
Paton 2008; Renn 2008; Haynes et al. 2008; Barclay
et al. 2008; Crosweller 2009; Bird et al. 2010; Paton
et al. 2010; Crosweller & Wilmshurst 2013; Wachinger
et al. 2013; Simoncini 2014). However, unlike say
health professionals, accountants and lawyers, scien-
tists are not usually given any privileges by law such as
a monopoly to practice in a defined service sector (e.g.
the monopolies evident in medicine, dentistry, actuar-
ial science, civil engineering, architecture, accountancy
and law).
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 14 of 24
In most jurisdictions (the Philippines and most states
of the USA and Canada being known exceptions) geo-
scientists, including but not limited to geologists and
volcanologists, are neither regulated nor licensed. The
practice of geology is not defined, given a special status,
or regulated. In short, individuals without any relevant
qualifications or experience whatsoever can describe
themselves as ‘geologists’. With no restrictions, they
can practice geology, prepare geological reports and
give advice. We are not saying that unregulated practi-
tioners, per se, are incompetent but note there is no
easy way to determine their status, experience or com-
petence by reference to recognised objective independ-
ent standards.
Geologists may seek voluntary membership of one or
more of nearly 300 geological societies and institutes
around the world (Geology.com website).13 Members are
invariably bound by the entity’s constitution, by-laws
and codes that commonly cover conduct, ethics and
mineral reporting. The European Federation of Geolo-
gists (EFG) has a Code of Ethics that, in common with
many other codes, addresses not only general principals
but also relationships with a number of other stake-
holders including the general public community (i.e. so-
ciety), other geologists, employers and clients. We
agree that “these codes do not spring from the work be-
ing regulated – they are imposed externally by the ex-
pectations of society at large” (Allen 2014). One of the
benefits of membership may be easier compliance with
title regulation formalities such as those in Alaska.
The EFG’s Code states that “the practice of geology is
a profession for those who possess the necessary qualifi-
cations and/or professional experience recognised by their
appropriate national body or under the law, and whose
living comes essentially from such work” (emphasis
added). We suggest here that it may be both ambitious
and misleading to assume that, other than in very few
countries, national bodies or laws exist that recognise
“necessary qualifications and/or professional experience”.
We noted earlier that the USA, Canada and the
Philippines are known exceptions to the general rule
of a total absence of ‘external’ regulation of geologists
and geology.
Some scientific societies openly acknowledge the
importance of compliance with the ‘law’ and ‘relevant
standards’. By way of example, the Royal Society of New
Zealand’s Code of Professional Standards and Ethics in
Science, Technology and the Humanities (Royal Society
of New Zealand 2012) states “a member must only claim
expertise commensurate with their qualifications and
fields of competence and must follow investigative and
work practices which conform to recognised national and
international standards [emphasis added]. Members
must “have regard to the requirements, work practices
and ethical standards of any relevant international or-
ganisation [emphasis added]”.
Other bodies, such as the International Association
of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior
(IAVCEI), may not have a formal code but instead
may offer guidance on conduct. The report entitled “Pro-
fessional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises14” is-
sued in 1999 by IAVCEI’s Subcommittee for Crisis
Protocols (Newhall et al. 1999, Newhall et al. 2000 Geist
& Garcia 2000) is a rare,15 if not unique, example of an at-
tempt to offer authoritative practice guidance based on
past events16 and an extensive literature review. The 1999
Report referred to Peterson’s very comprehensive and can-
did 1988 critique of the behaviour of volcanologists which
includes a robust call for them to examine themselves,
their roles and behaviours (Peterson 1988, 1996). With
reference to the earlier issue of ‘moral aspect’, the stated
guiding principle of the said report was “that during
volcanic crises, volcanologists’ highest duty is to public
safety and welfare”. In answer to some criticisms of the
1999 report (Geist & Garcia 2000), Newhall et al.
(2000) outlined some of reasons for written standards.
They stated:
We should also ask the rhetorical question, ‘Are codes
of conduct ever necessary?’ In our list of references
cited, readers can find quite a number of codes of
conduct. Our scientific world functions best when we
trust each other, and are trusted by those around us.
It seems to us, as well as to many scientific academies
and professional societies of the world, that written
standards and or goals help to build and maintain
that trust.
Conferment of a more senior status of voluntary
membership, such as that of ‘Fellow’, may involve con-
sideration of academic qualifications, relevant expertise
and competence in a specialist area, and participation
in continuing professional development with activities
related to the development of the individual’s professed
areas of expertise. Some bodies, such as the Geological
Society of London (GSOL), recognise the competence
of individual members in a specific field of geological
science through their validation as a ‘Chartered Geologist’
or ‘Chartered Scientist’. In July 2014 the GSOL reported
that chartership was gaining momentum “across the
profession” and, as a result, it was receiving a growing
number of applications (e.g. 45 in November 2013)
(Geoscientist 2013a; Geoscientist 2013b).
We conclude that most geoscientists involved in the
governance of volcanic risks do not belong to a ‘collect-
ive organisation’. By ‘collective organisation’ we mean
an independent self-regulating professional association)
which regulates admission, standards and other matters
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relating to their ‘practice’ as opposed to their initial
and continued ‘membership’ of, or ‘status’ within, the
organisation itself.
We accept that volcanologists working for national
government agencies may have access to and be bound
to follow established standards, policies and procedures
to guide their operational practices. We differentiate
between how volcanologists should operate by reason of
their contractual employment or engagement by a par-
ticular employer, usually a government agency, and how
they should practise by reason of their professed ‘status’
or ‘calling’ as competent volcanologists. In a perfect
world, there would be no conflict between contractual
standards and objective independent standards.
By way of theoretical context, Rothstein et al. (2006)
describe an ‘early stage’ societal risk governance environ-
ment with few pressures from internal and external
scrutiny. During this stage, the controls or accountability
pressures on the management of societal risks are
relaxed or non-existent, such as is often the case in the
early stages of regulation or slack self-regulatory re-
gimes. Under such conditions, in the absence of mecha-
nisms for challenge or even observation, societal risk
management behaviours and even failures present rela-
tively low managerial risks. Thus, there are few incen-
tives to proceduralise societal risk governance activities.
Instead, such activities tend to be ad hoc, methodo-
logically diverse and determined by contingent organ-
isational pressures and ways of working.
In summary, most volcanologists are currently subject
to neither ‘external’ nor ‘self ’ regulation, the hallmarks of
‘professionalism’. On close formal scrutiny, they may cur-
rently struggle to describe themselves as ‘professionals’.
This is very much more than a purely academic issue. The
absence of not only external regulation but also self-
regulation by means of collective organisation appears to
have led to a low understanding and perception of
managerial risks by many scientific communities. This is
evidenced by their reactions to the professional risk expo-
sures and vulnerabilities laid bare during the L’Aquila case.
We suggest that as a probable consequence, and as
predicted in theory (Rothstein et al. 2006), many processes
of societal risk governance appear to be ad hoc, methodo-
logically diverse and to lack any formal systematic proto-
col. Jordan et al. (2011) refer to the standardisation of
operational procedures being in a nascent stage of
development. This has led to the ‘standard equivocality’
referred to above.
Collective organisation
Steps have already been taken at the 2013 Volcano
Observatory Best Practices Workshop – Communicating
Hazards17 under the aegis of IAVCEI, the World Organisa-
tion of Volcano Observatories (WOVO) and the Global
Volcano Model network (GVM) to discuss international
references for hazard communication and wider risk man-
agement practices.
In September 2014 at the Cities on Volcanos 8 confer-
ence,18 IAVCEI set up a new Commission for Volcanic
Hazards and Risk. Hazard communication was identified
as a main theme with the specific tools of hazard map-
ping and alert levels (status of volcano activity levels)
being identified for particular attention by dedicated
working groups.
Within the new Commission, there will be a Taskforce
on Crisis Protocols and Best Practices charged specific-
ally with developing guidelines and protocols to help
scientists who are involved in managing major natural
hazards to develop a better understanding of their role,
responsibilities and liabilities and their relationships to
government and civil authorities.
IAVCEI is also discussing whether to leave the Inter-
national Union for Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG).19
With direct reference to L’Aquila, one of the many argu-
ments given by IAVCEI’s Committee for leaving IUGG,
and becoming an independent, autonomous learned soci-
ety, is greater freedom to lobby governments directly on
specific issues and to protect proactively scientists in-
volved in hazard assessment and mitigation (IAVCEI
2012–2014).
It is worth noting that, in the future, it is IAVCEI’s
intention to remain the pre-eminent international
volcanological society by: (1) organising conferences,
workshops etc.; (2) representing the interests of its pro-
fession and member scientists; and (3) continuing to be
the principal international reference organisation on
policy and commentary relating to volcanological re-
search, volcanic eruptions, hazards and risks (IAVCEI
News 2014 No. 2). Only time will tell whether we are
seeing the emergence of an independent, self-regulating,
professional association for volcanologists – an association
with the will, mandate and ability to provide some form of
‘standard unequivocality’, in other words, standards of
acceptable practice.
Praemonitus, praemunitus - Forewarned is forearmed
Each jurisdiction that hosts volcanic hazards will have
its own legal regime and histories of jurisprudence
and legal practice. A prudent volcanologist will take
proactive steps to seek basic advice about their legal
responsibilities and professional risks. A number of
generalised working assumptions can be made which
may prompt and guide cautious due diligence.
Under a number of ‘Getting better’ and ‘Getting
smarter’ subheadings, we link the most significant char-
acteristics of legal scrutiny processes to managerial
risks, which may susceptible to mitigation, and we offer
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in respect of each a non-exhaustive set of recommenda-
tions for action.
Getting better - Addressing the challenge of
standard equivocality
There is general legal principle that a professional, or
someone purporting to act professionally, should act in
accordance with: (1) the practice accepted as proper by a
responsible, reasonable and respectable body of opinion;
or (2) the recognised practice within his/her profession.
Simoncini (2014) refers to the level of diligence which
is expected from the so-called ‘model agent’ (homo
eiusdem professionis et condicionis). She states that it
consists of the hypothetical and ideal behaviour of an
agent who, by availing himself of personal and common
professional experience in that particular field, is devel-
oping his task in the best possible way and avoids pre-
dictable risk and avoidable consequences.
Opinion evidence will be usually be adduced: (1) to
establish what should have happened before, during and
after the index event in order to fulfil the functions and/
or achieve the goals required by law; and (2) to avoid the
foreseeable and difficult problem of ‘hindsight bias’
correctly identified by Gabrielli & Di Bucci (2014) and
Lauta (2014a). At the moment the acceptable practices
of volcanology, and in particular volcano observatories,
are very difficult to access. They may only be identified
too late – after a tragedy.
The thorny issue of ‘standard equivocality’ must be
confronted. Further consideration should be given to the
drafting of checklists to encourage the active and routine
consideration of critical issues and priorities. Their pur-
pose would be to identify, record, promote and develop
accepted practice (Newhall 201020). They might address
a range of topical issues such as hazard communication,
communicating uncertainty and disagreement and the
use of scientific and geological jargon.
Checklists may encourage rational, systematic, routine
and transparent due diligence whilst recognising the im-
portance of, and encouraging careful attention to, a wide
variety of constraints and expectations. These drivers
include geological, geographical, technical, contractual,
local, colonial, government structure,21 historical, cul-
tural,22 spiritual, linguistic,23 legal, time and resource
related, and organisational 24 factors.25 Constraints may
also be imposed by legal or pragmatic needs to engage
with and consult stakeholders in other jurisdictions who
‘share’ the hazards in question and/or their risks.
It is not envisaged that these checklists would be
either: (1) a regulatory device or an enforceable legal
requirement; or (2) ‘procedural armour against blame’, in
other words a blame-avoidance strategy that encourages
“sticking to the rules” and prioritises adherence to
rules or protocols of process above the achievement of
‘results’ (i.e. services focused upon and relevant to the
needs of risk decisions and their makers) (Hood 2001).26
Based upon the pioneering research of Gawande
(2010), these checklists would aim to reflect a number of
critical features that are outcome-focussed. As far as
reasonably practicable, each checklist should be: (1) con-
cise and preferably short as well; (2) simple; (3) targeted
by addressing only evidence-based priorities that are
considered either critical or significant to risk assessment;
and (4) non-prescriptive and non-comprehensive (World
Health Organisation 2008).27
They should aim to: (1) balance content and univer-
sality; (2) actively encourage and support volcano-
specific review and, if appropriate, revision (i.e. local
consideration, adaptation and ownership); (3) actively
encourage consideration of national laws and oper-
ational procedures that may reveal important inconsis-
tences between general good advice and specific local
requirements; and (4) avoid do’s and don’ts lists that
may appear prescriptive and thereby discourage active
on-going dialogue with all relevant stakeholders. By
way of illustration of what a checklist might contain, we
refer to the “ten important considerations for map makers
to take into account” in Thompson et al. (2015).
To support and supplement the checklists, we suggest
that guidance notes should be issued from time to time
to provide a dynamic and helpful knowledge and
innovation resource. Their aim should be: (1) to gather
together, record and share the underlying, accumulated
experience of other practitioners in relevant fields of
expertise; and (2) to suggest ways to find optimal solu-
tions to the most critical issues.
Marzocchi et al. (2012) advocate the use of decision-
making protocols set by “scientists and decision-makers
working together”. Before the onset of a crisis, these
protocols would define clear, transparent, flexible,
auditable and systematic ‘operational forecasting proce-
dures’. We suggest that a simple checklist might pro-
vide a generic framework to facilitate the preparation of
location-specific operational procedures. Marzocchi et al.
argue that transparent protocols have many advantages
that we suggest might equally apply to checklists.28
Getting better - Record keeping
Legal scrutiny processes, such as those illustrated in
Fig. 1 and detailed in our six case studies, will take place
following fatalities. In future they are likely to reflect the
minimum international law standards summarised in
Table 2.
Factual evidence will establish: (1) what actually hap-
pened answering the obvious questions who? what?
why? where? when? and with what direct and indirect
consequences? and (2) what was planned to happen
before, during and after the index event.
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Prudent volcano scientists should adopt a working
assumption that, from time to time, their practices will
be subjected to detailed scrutiny. Accordingly their op-
erational practices should be suitable, sufficient and fit
for purpose at all times and appropriate contemporan-
eous records should be kept for the purposes of
accountability.
Factual witnesses, who may be ordered to give evi-
dence if necessary, will refer or be referred to all relevant
records and documents. These may include minutes of
meetings, emails, reports, assessments, data records,
press releases etc. Factual inferences, which might not
be helpful, may be drawn in the absence of records and
documents. Records are therefore very important.
Gaining better - Understanding legal processes
The L’Aquila trial and our other case studies show that
in the future scientific practices and scientists will be
scrutinised in public, at length and in detail. The eviden-
tial processes of examination and cross-examination
may themselves be testing and harmful irrespective of
any findings of fact or liability. Training in the relevant
court process and evidence-giving may be helpful.
Getting better - Defining duty holders
and their responsibilities
Any meaningful post-facto examination of the circum-
stances surrounding an index event will start with
attempts to gain an overall appreciation of the relevant
legal and administrative framework. This infrastructure
provides the contextual backdrop (i.e. the constants)
against which evidence will be adduced about actual op-
erative policies, procedures, people and places.
National laws should be drafted to provide a compre-
hensive, comprehensible and coherent infrastructure for
societal risk governance. The respective duties of all risk
governance players (i.e. all duty holders) should be
identified, understood and followed strictly. This issue
has been emphasised recently in the IFRC’s pilot check-
list of law and disaster reduction which poses the
question “Do your laws establish clear roles and respon-
sibilities for all relevant institutions from national to
local level?” (International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies IFRC and United Nations
Development Programme 2015, 9). A simple flow dia-
gram or chart that links specific roles to the main risk
governance duties29 should assist not only in display-
ing the framework and direct/indirect relationships but
also identifying overlaps and lacunae.
One of the lessons derived from the L’Aquila trial is that,
in relation to an entity such as a commission or commit-
tee which is the sum of its members on a particular
day and in relation to a particular decision or action,
the status, roles, responsibilities and accountabilities
of: (1) the entity; and (2) each and every member of it
should be specified, understood and respected (Simoncini
2014). During the L’Aquila appeal hearing, lawyers for
the defendants argued that the roles and duties of their
clients were unclear and that they had been accused of
failing to fulfil duties that did not belong to them
(Rosen 2014).
Scolobig et al. (2014) refer to the dangers of ‘institu-
tional overlap’ resulting from overlapping roles, respon-
sibilities and mandates in the decision making process.
In respect of L’Aquila they argue that the presence of
deep epistemic uncertainty intrinsic in the provision of
advice, coupled with unclear and mixed roles of the
scientists-turned-decision makers, are fundamental to
understanding the event and the legal aftermath. They
suggest that some members of the Italian CGR simultan-
eously acted as advisors, public officials, and decision
makers, without necessarily being aware of it.
Simoncini (2014) referring to L’Aquila notes the
possible harm that can be derived from: (1) under-
estimating the necessity of science’s autonomy (i.e. main-
taining the separation between the science of hazard
assessment and the political goals of risk management
decisions); and (2) any confusion of responsibilities.
There are foreseeable weaknesses when a governance
system involves a number of entities ‘which require
different and consistent roles and tasks to be performed,
but need to be co-ordinated under the supervision of a
central authority’ (Simoncini 2014).
It is therefore very important to ascertain with great
clarity the infrastructural demarcation, if any, between
not only hazard assessment and risk assessment but also
risk assessment and risk management.
Getting better – Communicating
The L’Aquila, Garcés, Fernandez and Vilnes cases all
concerned issues of hazard/risk communication. In the
L’Aquila trial, it was alleged the Commissione Nazionale
per la Previsione e Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi (CGR)
had a duty to address its advice to and communicate
directly only with the Dipartmento della Protezione
Civile (DPC). It should not have communicated directly
with the public (Scolobig et al. 2014).
We suggest that communications of natural hazard
characterisations to non-scientists – interactions that
inevitable involve issues of timing, format, content,
method and source - represent a foreseeable and unique
moment of managerial risk ‘exposure’ and the instance
of greatest ‘vulnerability’.
The reporting and communication relationships between
all duty holders should be designed carefully, identified,
understood, practised and followed strictly. Recent
press releases reflect the very considerable care that
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goes into the crafting of statements about the likelihood
of future natural hazards (Amos 2014).
Communication difficulties were also evident during
the volcanic incidents in Guadeloupe (1976), St Vincent
(1979) and Mount St Helens, Washington, USA (2004)
(Fiske 1984; Driedger et al. 2008. 505; Frenzen &
Matarrese 2008). The last provides a graphic illustration
of the challenges of: (1) balancing accurate interpreta-
tions of data under crisis conditions with the need to
share information quickly; (2) articulating uncertainties
for a variety of volcanic scenarios; (3) minimising scien-
tific jargon; and (4) frequently updating and effectively
distributing talking points. It also identifies the import-
ance of clarity of communication and through preplan-
ning among interagency stakeholders.
Getting smarter - Risk transfer by means of liability
insurance policies and contractual indemnities
Based upon any breaches of duty that are found ex-post
facto, civil awards of compensation may be made and
criminal sanctions imposed.
In theory in most, if not all, jurisdictions it should be
possible for duty holders to get public liability insurance,
professional indemnity insurance or a contractual in-
demnity in respect of compensation claims and the cost
of defending criminal prosecutions. Actually obtaining
adequate insurance cover at a reasonable price or a
worthwhile contractual indemnity may be an entirely
different matter.
In some jurisdictions, state employees undertaking
certain duties (e.g. training, emergency and some discre-
tionary functions that involve the provision of urgent
assistance to people who are injured, ill or in danger)
may be given a degree of immunity from civil claims
and/or immunity from criminal prosecution. Any avail-
able legal protection (including immunity under ‘Good
Samaritan’, emergency services or liability protection
legislation) will be carefully constrained and usually re-
quire formal advice from a specialist lawyer to under-
stand fully. By way of example, in California USA the
California Tort Claims Act and Emergency Services Act
provide limited immunities in certain circumstances to
state employees, volunteers and conscripted persons.
In many jurisdictions, as a matter of public policy
enforced by law, it will not be possible to insure against
the consequences of criminal law sanctions and in par-
ticular fines and financial penalties.
Getting smarter - What advice to offer, when and on
what terms
Certain individuals (e.g. academic scientists invited to
join scientific advisory committees) and perhaps even
some non-governmental entities will have the oppor-
tunity to withdraw their services, not to opt into the
infrastructure of risk governance and thereby to avoid
managerial risks altogether. It was this withdrawal of
scientific expertise that was predicted by most L’Aquila
press statements.30
Conclusions
Previous sections have sought to explain, by reference to
‘constants’ and ‘variables’ within a generalised legal infra-
structure, why further debate about the disputed factual
detail of the L’Aquila trial is unnecessary in the context
considered here. Readers are encouraged to take an
active interest in national and international court cases
involving natural hazards but advised to frame and con-
sider them very carefully in a wider context of societal
risk governance.
High profile court cases are very rarely reported in the
mass media in either an accurate or a balanced fashion.
Despite this truism, they can serve a very helpful role by
opening the Black Box of societal risk management so
that robust and candid scrutiny of the past can lead to
better management of the future. The art of the compe-
tent and prudent observer is to rise above debated
factual details of the past (what happened?) and to
identify wider issues of principle and precedent upon
which to make reasoned changes (what should happen
in the future?).
Given the current rarity of past cases and resulting
data, we suggest that richer reactive analyses may be
achieved by adopting a counterfactual approach in order
to construct alternative plausible versions of history
including plausible near-misses scenarios. In relation to
the facts of the index event in question and each identi-
fied counterfactual scenario, it may then be possible to
answer the question “Why didn’t this happen before?”
This question can, of course, be asked not only in rela-
tion to the disaster but also the resulting legal processes.
In this way, the management of the future can be
founded on both factual (i.e. case-specific) and counter-
factual histories (Woo 2010, 2011, 2015).
Recent cases have alerted managers of volcanic and
other risks to the reality that they are not immune from
robust accountability. By the nature of their vital roles,
they are exposed. As a result of their current operational
practices, they may also be vulnerable. Their roles,
duties and working practices will be scrutinised and
must be capable of detailed public explanation and
justification.
We suggest that, in response to the challenges of more
frequent and more intrusive scrutiny, scientific commu-
nities should concentrate on “Getting Better” at their es-
sential contribution to societal risk mitigation and
ensure that their services are relevant to and focussed
upon the needs and expectations of risk decisions and
their makers. This will ensure that future evidence-based
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scientific advice not only remains readily available when it
is most needed (i.e. remains timely particularly during pe-
riods of emerging unrest) but also maintains its traditional
hallmarks of rigour, excellence, objectivity, consistency, in-
dependence, balance and value-free neutrality.
A lasting and befitting legacy of the L’Aquila tragedy
may be an emerging appreciation that much more can
and should be done to identify, discuss and agree ways
to develop ‘acceptable’ standards and better practices –
in other word, ways of “Getting Better”. Top of the ac-
tion list is likely to remain outcome-focussed ‘oper-
ational forecasting’,31 the challenges of which include
how to explain in a comprehensible way the spatial and
physical parameters of the most common volcanic haz-
ard scenarios, how to characterise their temporal param-
eters (i.e. how to offer forecasting of their onset and
duration), and how to interact effectively with civil pro-
tection authorities and at-risk communities.
Endnotes
1The authors of this paper do not claim first use of
these carefully crafted expressions which are thought to
be based upon and to summarise the approaches
adopted by Hood (1986, 2001) and Rothstein et al.
(2006). The exact origin was mislaid during the prepar-
ation of this paper and the authors would welcome the
opportunity to give full credit to the relevant author/s
and source.
2Simoncini (2014) identifies this issue in relation to
the L’Aquila trial. “In fact, according to [the L’Aquila ver-
dict], the significance of the opinion issued by the scien-
tists in that case is directly linked to their membership
of an administrative body charged with specific compe-
tence and tasks by the legislation. If the scientists had
exclusively expressed the opinion as mere experts or
scholars, the effects of such opinion would have been
limited to their scientific community; but since they
were involved in the regulatory process as members of
an administrative Commission, their opinion produces
some legal effects on those parties involved in the miti-
gation process as both regulators and recipients”.
3Latour (1987) Black Box - A device, system or object
in respect of which we know the inputs and outputs but
we do not know (or do not need to know) the internal
process or workings.
4Notaro (2014) refers to convictions of involuntary
manslaughter by gross negligence under Articles 110
and 589 of the Italian Penal Code.
5The IFRC’s pilot checklist on law and disaster risk re-
duction makes many references to the need for sufficient
resources to be budgeted for risk governance and for
relevant institutions from national to local level to be
assigned the authority and resources to carry out their
mandates and responsibilities (International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies IFRC and
United Nations Development Programme 2015, 9-11)
6Hood & Rothstein (2001) note that in parliamentary
democracies, it is conventional to regard the final arbi-
ters of public value as voters and elected representatives.
7A duty holder wishing to establish that societal risks
have been reduced ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ has
to show that the costs (the sacrifice) of further feasible
safety measures would be grossly disproportionate to the
additional safety benefits of those measures (based upon
United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation 2013).
8Simoncini (2014) notes the L’Aquila verdict indicates
that prudence in realising risk communications is neces-
sary. “However, no directions or guidelines have been
provided for the performance of this task. Soon after the
L’Aquila verdict, some scholars [a reference to Sirota &
Juanchich 2012] were claiming the need for ‘evidence
based risk communication guidelines’ which can outline
methodologies of risk communication and therefore
‘protect both the risk information recipient and the risk
information provider’.”
9Simoncini (2014) notes “The allocation of liability –
including its criminal profiles- is therefore a consequen-
tial issue within the accountability framework, but it can
also play a deterrent function by stimulating experts to
do their job correctly. However, this works effectively
only in a transparent responsibility framework, when in-
dividual can know in advance what their task are and
what the expected level and nature of their performance
is [Emphasis added].” It is suggested here that, due to
‘standard equivocality’, it is far from clear what standards
of performance are acceptable in practice and/or in law!
10Italy’s Commissione Nazionale per la Previsione e
Prevenzione dei Grandi Rischi (CGR) was established by
law 225/1992. Since the L’Aquila disaster, its organisation
and functions have been redefined. This was done by the
decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of
7 October 2011 and published in the Official Gazette
on 31 December 2011 (Presidenza del Consiglio dei
Ministri Dipartimento della Protezione Civile DPC
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/homepa-
ge.wp. Accessed 13 October 2014).
11Professor F. D’ Alessandro, Professor of Criminal Law
at the Universita’ Cattolica of Milan in Dipartimento della
Protezione Civile and Fondazione CIMA, Eds. 2013.
12Notaro (2014) refers to a possible inference drawn
by the L’Aquila Judge that the CGR scientists should prob-
ably have communicated, rather than the absence of risk,
the impossibility of either affirming or ruling out any risk
to L’Aquila and its citizens at the time. Significantly, he
then comments “However no indications emerge in the
law to support this specific inference on the part of the
Judge. On the contrary, it would be beneficial to know on
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advance precisely what behaviour is expected of one tack-
ing the risk, for each critical situation. Thus the risk would
be reduced more effectively if the instruments of allocat-
ing liability for inadequate conduct would be better suited
to the consultancy role that scientists carry out in line
with their duties”. He adds later “the provisions of the law
should indicate exactly what [the] roles and duties of
[commission members] consist of (indeed scientists them-
selves have pressed for such clarification).”
13Geology.com has a useful list of over 290 geoscience
professional societies and organisations.
14For the purposes of this report, volcanic crisis was de-
fined as ’a time of significantly increased volcanic activity
that requires around-the-clock response for both scientific
purposes and for public safety. The greater the urgency
for accurate and precise forecasts, the greater the crisis.
(Newhall et al. 2000)
15In 1994 IAVCEI published a report entitled ‘Safety
recommendations for volcanologists and the public’ that
suggested procedures to prevent, or at least reduce, the
incidence of disasters related to researching and moni-
toring volcanic activity (Arameki, Barberi, Casadevall &
McNutt 1994 Bulletin of Volcanology Vol. 56 151–154)
16Crises at Long Valley, Pinatubo, Unzen, Popacatetl
and Montserrat.
17This was held in Erice, Sicily, Italy 2–6 November
2013.
18This was held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia 9–13 September
2014.
19IUGG is a non-governmental organisation that was
established in 1919. It is dedicated to the scientific study
of the Earth and to the application of the knowledge
gained to the needs of society. The IUGG consists of
seven associations, of which IAVCEI is one (IAVCEI
website).
20At Cities on Volcanoes 6 in Tenerife in 2010, Chris
Newhall advocated the use of checklists. Within a presen-
tation entitled “A checklist for volcanic risk mitigation”,
he identified four reasons for their use namely: (1) We’re
human and can forget things, especially in a crisis; (2) We
move on…people change jobs, retire…; (3) They are a
shorthand way of capturing and passing on experience;
and (4) they also force us to think about what we do, why
we do it, and whether there might be better ways to do it.
21Donovan and Oppenheimer (2014) in respect of his-
torical issues in Montserrat.
22Recent research indicates that important differences
may exist in the way states think about their role and pur-
pose in preventing adverse governance outcomes. These
differences may be revealed not only in relationships be-
tween risk and governance but also the factors that shape
national governance styles (Rothstein et al. 2012).
23By way of illustration, Sparks & Aspinall (2004) em-
phasise the critical difference between ‘forecast and
’prediction; Wolman (2014, 25) notes, in the context of
L’Aquila, that communicating forecasts in Italian is an
extra challenge. In English ‘forecast’ can be used instead of
‘prediction’ to convey some uncertainty. In Italian, there is
only ‘previsione’ which apparently has a strong determinis-
tic connotation.
24Driedger et al. (2008)
25Donovan and Oppenheimer (2014) in Table 1 identify
geographical, contractual, cultural, political, economic and
local issues (complexities, variations, sensitivities and in-
fluences) of which scientist should be aware.
26Hood (2011) identifies three types of blame-avoidance
strategy, one being policy strategies – the selection of pol-
icies and operating routines to minimise risk of individual
or institutional liability or blame. One variant of policy
strategies is protocolisation ‘sticking to the rules’ –
defensive science through best-practice protocols. In
other words, actions that encourage the triumph of
process over results!
27The World Health Organisations checklists expressly
state “The checklist is not intended to be comprehen-
sive. Additions and modifications to fit local practice are
encouraged.” (WHO 2008)
28Marzocchi et al. (2012) state “ Transparent decision-
making protocols have several important advantages: i)
they allow scientists and decision-makers to justify the ac-
tions taken, or not taken, at any time; ii) they have educa-
tional value for society, decision-makers and scientists in
improving understanding of the scientific and practical
choices made; iii) they make it easier to manage the some-
times frequent changes in personnel involved in the
decision-making process; iv) they clarify the role and re-
sponsibility of any partner involved in the decision-
making process
29Lewis et al. 2014 – see Table 4.3
30According to the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Min-
istri Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC) web-
site, following the L’Aquila convictions “the Presidency
Office and some members of the current [CGR] have
resigned, believing that in such conditions it was no
longer possible to carry out a clear and effective
progress of work of the [CGR]. At a later stage, also as
a result of various interlocutions with representatives of
the Government aimed to identify the most appropriate
mode for a serene work of the [CGR], almost all of
the members who have resigned suspended their
resignation.”
31Jordan (2006), Jordan et al. (2011), Marzocchi et al.
(2012); Jordan et al. (2014). Marzocchi et al. (2012) re-
fers to ‘Operational Eruption Forecasting’ and Jordan
et al. (2014) defines ‘operational earthquake forecasting’
as “the dissemination of authoritative information about
time-dependent probabilities to help communities pre-
pare for potentially destructive earthquakes.”
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 21 of 24
Additional files
Additional file 1: Infrastructure and Resourcing.
Additional file 2: Specialised bodies.
Additional file 3: Duties of care and Rights.
Additional file 4: Authority and Powers.
Additional file 5: Criminal Law offences and Regulation of
geologists and geology.
Abbreviations
AIPG: American Institute of Professional Geologists; CGR: La Commissione
Nazionale per la Previsione e Prevenzione Dei Grandi Rischi;
DPC: Dipartmento della Protezione Civile; ECHR: European Court of Human
Rights; EConHR: European Convention of Human Rights; EFG: European
Federation of Geologists; GNS: Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences
Limited, New Zealand; GSOL: Geological Society of London; GVM: Global
Volcano Model network; IAVCEI: International Association of Volcanology and
Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior; IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies; IUGG: International Union for Geodesy and
Geophysics; UOB: University of Bristol, United Kingdom; UN: United Nations;
VUELCO: Volcanic Unrest in Europe; Latin America: Phenomenology, eruption
precursors, hazard forecast, and risk mitigation; WHO: World Health Organisation;
WOVO: World Organisation of Volcano Observatories.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
RB undertook the legal research and most of the related analysis and
manuscript drafting. JG, RC and WA contributed to the overall structuring
and purpose of the paper and its methodology, findings and conclusions.
All authors edited, read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
RB graduated from UOB with a LLB (Hons) Law degree in 1975 and has
practised as a UK lawyer since 1978. For most of his career, he was a
litigation solicitor specialising in regulatory law – in particular occupational
health and safety law compliance - and, in later years, the defence of criminal
prosecutions against utility companies following serious accidents and fatalities.
He continues to practise part-time and is a Consultant with an international law
firm fulfilling the senior management roles of Compliance Officer for Legal
Practice and Money Laundering Officer.
In 2009 RB returned to UOB and graduated with a BSc (Hons) in Geology in
2012. He has the unusual, if not unique, distinction of over 35 years’
experience of legal practice in the relevant field of regulatory law (health &
safety) supplemented by a more recent academic qualification in geology.
RB is actively involved in European Cooperation in Science & Technology
(COST) Action - Individuals, Societies, Cultures and Health IS1304 (Expert
Judgment Network: Bridging the Gap Between Scientific Uncertainty and
Evidence-Based Decision Making). He is co-leading the ‘Law & Policy’ theme
of WG1 ‘Process & Procedure’.
JG is a geologist at the University of Bristol with broad interests in
volcanological research.
Acknowledgements
We are very grateful for critical feedback and constructive criticism from
Professor Stephen Sparks, Dr Christopher Newhall, Dr Carina Fearnley and
Anne Hunt. We also wish to thank two anonymous and one other reviewer
for the time and care which they took in reviewing the original manuscript.
Their candid input has greatly improved the content and format of the final
version of this paper.
We also acknowledge very helpful and relevant contributions from Guido
Giordano, Ray Cas, Carolyn l. Driedger, Lizzette A. Rodriguez Iglesias, Jan
Lindsay, Christopher Newhall and John Pallister in relation to a related
discussion paper currently being drafted for IAVCEI on checklists and
guidance notes.
This research leading to this paper received funding from the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant
agreement No. 282759 ‘VUELCO’.
The first author dedicates this paper to Mr Twig who died on 21 June 2015.
He was greatly loved and will be much missed.
Author details
1School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol, Wills Memorial Building,
Queens Road, Bristol BS8 1RJ, UK. 2School of Sociology, Politics &
International Studies, University of Bristol, 4 Priory Road, Bristol BS8 1TU, UK.
Received: 22 October 2014 Accepted: 19 June 2015
References
Alexander DE (2014a) Communicating earthquake risk to the public: the trial of
the ‘L’Aquila Seven’ Nat. Hazards. doi:10.1007/s11069-014-1062-2
Alexander DE (2014b) Reply to a comment by Franco Gabrielli and Daniela Di
Bucci: Communicating earthquake risk to the public: the trial of the ‘L’Aquila
Seven’ Nat. Hazards. doi:10.1007/s11069-014-1323-0
Allen P (2014) Science and profession, Geoscientist Online http://www.geolsoc.org.uk/
Geoscientists/July-2014/Science-and-profession. Accessed 17 July 2014.
Amos J (2014) Chile quake hazards remain high, BBC News Science &
Environment http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-28760988.
Accessed 5 September 2014
Aspinall WP (2011) Check your legal position before advising others. Nature
477:250. doi:10.1038/477251a
Aspinall WP, Sparks RSJ (2004) Volcanology and the law. IAVCEI News 1:4
http://www.iavcei.org/documents/newsletters/2004/iavcei_news_2004_1.pdf
Bankoff G, Frerks G, Hilhorst D (2004) Mapping Vulnerability – Disasters,
Development & People. Earthscan, London and New York
Barclay J, Haynes K, Mitchell T, Solana C, Teeuw R, Darnell A, Crosweller HS, Cole
P, Pyle D, Lowe C, Fearnley C, Kelman I (2008) Framing volcanic risk
communication within disaster risk reduction: finding ways for the social and
physical sciences to work together. In: Liverman DGE, Pereira CPG, Marker B
(eds) Communicating Environmental Geoscience Geological Society, 305th
edn. Special Publications, London, pp 163–77. doi:10.1144/SP305.14
Basher R (2006) Global early warning systems for natural hazards: systematic and
people-centred. Phil Trans R Soc 364:2167–2182
Bentham J, Quinn M (2001) Writings on the Poor Laws Vol. 1. Clarendon, Oxford
Bergman D, Davis C, Rigby B (2007) International comparison of health and
safety responsibilities of company directors. HSE research report RR 53, 207.
http://www.hse.gov.uk/leadership/international.pdf
Bird DK, Gìsladóttir G, Dominey-Howes D (2010) Volcanic risk and tourism in southern
Iceland: Implications for hazard, risk and emergency response, education and
training. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 189:33–48
Bonnefoy P (2013) Chilean Judge Upholds Manslaughter Charges Linked to 2010
Tsunami. New York Times, May 16, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/
17/world/americas/chilean-judge-upholds-manslaughter-charges-against-
officials-over-tsunami-alert.html. Accessed 11 July 2014
Brown MB (2009) Science in democracy. MIT Press, Cambridge MA
Budayeva & others v Russia, (2008) Applications 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02,
11673 & 15343/02, judgment of 20 March 2008, ECHR 15339/02
Cartlidge E. (2015) Why Italian earthquake scientists were exonerated http://
news.sciencemag.org/earth/2015/02/why-italian-earthquake-scientists-were-
exonerated doi: 10.1126/science.aaa7841
Clay EB, Barrow C, Benson C, Dempster J, Kokelaar BP, Pillai N, Seaman J (1999)
An evaluation of HMG’s response to the Montserrat volcanic emergency.
Department for International Development, London
Commission on Global Governance (1995) Our Global Neighbourhood. Oxford
University Press -, Oxford
Crosweller HS (2009) An analysis of factors influencing volcanic risk
communication on two islands in the Lesser Antilles. Unpublished PhD
Thesis, University of East Anglia
Crosweller HS, Wilmshurst J (2013) Risk and Uncertainty Assessment for Natural
Hazards. In: Rougier J, Steve Sparks S, Hill L (eds) Natural Hazards and risk.
Cambridge University Press, UK
Donovan A, Oppenheimer C (2012) Governing the lithosphere: Insights from
Eyjafjallajökull concerning the role of scientists in supporting decision-
making on active volcanoes. J Geophys Res 117:B03214. doi:10.1029/
2011JB009080,2012
Donovan A, Oppenheimer C (2014) Science, policy and place in volcanic
disasters: Insights from Montserrat. Environ Sci Pol 38:150–61, May 2014
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 22 of 24
Driedger C, Neal CA, Knappenberger TH, Needham DH, Harper RB, Steele WP
(2008) Hazard information management during the autumn 2004
reawakening of Mount St. Helens Volcano, Washington. In: Sherrod DR, Scott
WE, Stauffer PH (eds) A Volcano Rekindled: The Renewed Eruption of Mount
St. Helens, 2004–2006. Geological Survey Professional Paper, U.S, 1750, 2008
Duffield C (2013) Supreme Court orders compensation be paid to tsunami
victim’s relatives. http://santiagotimes.cl/supreme-court-orders-compensation-
paid-tsunami-victims-relatives/. Accessed 29 September 2014
Earle TC (2004) Thinking aloud about trust: a protocol analysis of trust in risk
management. Risk Anal 24:169–83
Eden S (1998) Environmental issues: Knowledge, uncertainty and the
environment. Progr Hum Geogr 22(3):425–32
Felstiner WLF, Abel RL, Sarat A (1980) The emergence and transformation of
disputes: naming, blaming, claiming. Law and Society Review 15(3–4):631–54
Fioritto A (2014) Science, scientists and judges Can judges try science? EJRR 3(2):133–6
Fischer F (2000) Citizens, Experts and the Environment: The politics of local
knowledge. Taylor & Francis, Durham, NC
Fischer F (2010) Democracy and Expertise: Reorienting policy enquiry. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK
Fiske R (1984) Volcanologists, Journalists, and the Concerned Local Public: A Tale
of Two Crises in the Eastern Caribbean Explosive Volcanism: Inception,
Evolution and Hazards, pp 170–6
Frenzen PM, Matarrese MT (2008) Managing public and media response to a
reawakening volcano: Lessons from the 2004 Eruptive Activity of Mount St.
Helens. In: Sherrod DR, Scott WE, Stauffer PH (eds) A Volcano Rekindled: The
Renewed Eruption of Mount St. Helens, 2004–2006. Geological Survey
Professional Paper, U.S, 750, 2008
Gabrielli F, Di Bucci D (2014) Comment on “Communicating earthquake risk to
the public: the trial of the ‘L’Aquila Seven” by David Alexander. Nat Hazards.
doi:10.1007/s11069-014-1322-1
Gawande A (2010) The Checklist Manifesto – How to get things right. Profile
Books Ltd, London
Geist D, Garcia MO (2000) Role of science and independent research during
volcanic eruptions. Bull Volcanol 62:59–61
Geology.com website Geoscience Professional Societies & Organisations page
http://geology.com/societies.htm#b. Accessed 30 June 2014
Geoscientist Online (2013a) Chartership News http://geolsoc.org.uk/Geoscientist/
Archive/December-January-2013–14/Chartership-News. Accessed 17 July 2014
Geoscientist Online (2013b) Your Society needs YOU! http://geolsoc.org.uk/
Geoscientist/Archive/December-January-2013–14/Your-Society-needs-You.
Accessed 17 July 2014
Guerra v Italy (1998) 4 BHRC 63, 26 EHRR 357
Haynes K (2005) Exploring the communication of risk during volcanic crisis: A
case study of Montserrat. University of East Anglia, West Indies, (Unpublished
PhD. Thesis
Haynes K, Barclay J, Pidgeon N (2008) The issue of trust and its influence on risk
communication during a volcanic crisis. Bull Volcanol 70:605–21
Hicks A, Barclay J, Simmons P, Loughlin S (2013) An interdisciplinary approach to
volcanic risk reduction under conditions of uncertainty: a case study of
Tristan da Cunha. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sc 1:7779–820. doi:10.5194/nhessd-
1-7779-2013, www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci-discuss.net/1/7779/2013/
Hood C (1986) Administrative Analysis: An introduction to rules, enforcement
and organisations. Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, Sussex
Hood C (2001) The risk game and the blame game. Gov Oppos 3(1):15–37.
doi:10.1111/1477-7053.00085
Hood C (2011) The Blame Game – Spin, bureaucracy and self-preservation in
government. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA and
Woodstock, Oxfordshire, UK
Hood C, Rothstein H (2000) Business Risk Management in Government: Pitfalls and
Possibilities (October 2000). CARR Discussion Paper No. 0 (Launch Paper). Available
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=471221 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.471221
Hood C, Rothstein H (2001) Risk regulation under pressure: Problem Solving or
Blame Shifting? Administration & Society 33:21–53
IAVCEI (2012-2014) International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the
Earth's Interior News http://www.iavcei.org/
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and
United Nations Development Programme (2015) The checklist on law and
disaster risk reduction, Pilot version, March 2015. IFRC, Geneva, Switzerland
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (2005) Risk Governance - Towards
an Integrated Approach, White Paper No.1. Renn O with an Annex by
Graham P. IRGC, Geneva, Switzerland
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (2007) An introduction to the IRGC
Risk Governance Framework. Policy Brief, IRGC, Geneva, Switzerland
International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (2009) What is risk governance?,
www.irgc.org
Jasanoff S (2005) Designs on Nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the
United States. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Jordan TH (2006) Earthquake predictability, brick by brick. Seismol Res Lett 77:3–6
Jordan TH, Chen Y-T, Gasparini P, Madariaga R, Main I, Marzocchi W,
Papadopoulos G, Sobolev G, Yamaoka K, Zschau J (2011) Operational
earthquake forecasting: State of knowledge and guidelines for implementation,
Findings and Recommendations of the International Commission on
Earthquake Forecasting for Civil Protection, submitted to the Department of
Civil Protection, Rome, Italy. Ann Geophys 54:4. doi:10.4401/ag-5350
Jordan TH, Marzocchi W, Michael AJ, Gerstenberger MC (2014) Operational
earthquake forecasting can enhance earthquake preparedness Seismol. Res
Lett 85(5):955–9. doi:10.1785/0220140143
Kats & others v Ukraine (2008) Application 29971/04 51 EHRR 1
Kolyadenko & others v Russia (2012) Applications 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05,
23263/05, 24283/05, 35673/05, ECHR 17423/05
Latour B (1987) Science in Action: How to follow scientist and engineers through
society. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
Lauta KC (2014a) Disaster Law. Routledge, Oxford and New York
Lauta KC (2014b) New fault lines? On responsibility and disasters. EJRR 3(2):137–45
Lewis H, Allan N, Ellinas C, Godfrey P (2014) Engaging with risk. CIRIA, London
Marzocchi W, Newhall C, Woo G (2012) The scientific management of volcanic
crises Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research.. doi:10.1016/
j.volgeorgres.2012.08.016
Montserrat (1998) HM Coroner’s Inquest Report 31.12
Montserrat (1999) Press release “Inquest verdict on 19 deaths in volcanic
eruption”, issued on 11/01/99 by James White Jr. the Press Officer in the
Office of the Chief Minister.
National Research Council (NRC) (1983) Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government: Managing the Process. Committee on the Institutional Means
of Assessment of Risks to Public Health, National Academy of Sciences,
National Academy Press, Washington, DC, USA
National Research Council (NRC) (1996) Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions
in a Democratic Society. National Academy of Sciences, National Academy
Press, Washington, DC, USA
New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment website Media
Releases page “Investigation into Raoul Island death complete” dated 13
October 2006 http://www.dol.govt.nz/news/media/2006/raoul-island.asp.
Accessed 2 July 2014
Newhall CG (2010) A checklist for volcanic risk mitigation, Cities on Volcanoes 6
presentation, Earth Observatory of Singapore
Newhall C, Aramaki S, Barberi F, Blong R, Calavache M, Cheminee J-L,
Punongbayan R, Siebe C, Simkin T, Sparks S, Tjetjep W (1999) International
Association of Volcanology and Chemistry (IAVCEI) Subcommittee for Crisis
Protocols - Professional conduct of scientists during volcanic crises. Bull
Volcanol 60:323–34
Newhall C, Aramaki S, Barberi F, Blong R, Calavache M, Cheminee JL,
Punongbayan R, Siebe C, Simkin T, Sparks S, Tjetjep W, Djumarna A (2000)
International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry (IAVCEI)
Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols. Bull Volcanol 62:62–4
Notaro D (2014) Scientists and earthquake risk prediction: ‘Ordinary’ liability in an
extraordinary case? EJRR 3(2):159–67
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2002)
Outcome focussed Management in the United Kingdom by Ellis K & Mitchell
S. OECD Publications, Paris, France
OECD, Kristensen JK, Walter SG, Bühler B (2002) Outcome focussed Management
and Budgeting. OECD Publications, Paris, France
Oneryildiz v Turkey (2004) Application 48939/99 18 BHRC 145, 41 EHRR 20
Paton D (2008) Risk Communication and natural hazard mitigation: how trust
influences its effectiveness. Disast Prev Manag 12(3):210–6
Paton D, Sagal S, Okada N, Jang L, Bürgelt PT, Gregg CE (2010) Making sense of
natural hazard mitigation: personal, social and cultural influences.
Environmental Hazards 9(2):183–196
Peterson DW (1988) Volcanic Hazards and Public Response. Journal of
Geophysical Research 93:4161–4170
Peterson DW (1996) Mitigation measures and preparedness plans for volcanic
emergencies. In: Scarpa R, Tilling RI (eds) Monitoring and Mitigation of
Volcano Hazards. Springer, Berlin, pp 701–718
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 23 of 24
Pielke RA (2004) When scientists politicize science: making sense of controversy
over ‘The Skeptical Environmentalist’. Environ Sci Pol 7(5):405–17
Possekel A (1999) Living with the Unexpected: Linking Disaster Recovery to
Sustainable Development in Montserrat. Springer, Berlin
Powell J, Stewart R (eds) (2012) Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (7th
Edition). Thomson Reuters, London
Power M (2007) Organised Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management.
Oxford University Press, Oxford
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri Dipartimento della Protezione Civile (DPC)
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/homepage.wp. Accessed 13
October 2014
Rantsev v Cyprus & Russia (2010) Application 25965/04 51 EHRR 1
Renn O (2008) Earthscan, London & New York (1991) Credibility and trust in risk
communication. In: Kasperson RE, Stallen PJM (eds) Risk Governance –
Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World. Communicating risk to the
public, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 175–218
Renn O, Levine D (1991) Credibility and trust in risk communication. In:
Kasperson RE, Stallen PJM (eds) Communicating risk to the public. Kluwer,
Dordrecht, pp 175–218
Rosen J (2014) The ‘L’Aquila 7’ appeal their sentence Eos, American Geophysical
Union, 30 October 2014
Rosenau J, Bache I, Flinders M (2004) Strong demand, huge supply: governance
in an emerging epoch. Multi-level governance, Oxford University Press
Rothstein H (2002) Neglected Risk Regulation: the institutional attenuation
problem, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation. London School of
Economics and Political Science, London
Rothstein H (2014) Exploring national cultures of risk governance http://www.lse.ac.uk/
researchAndExpertise/units/CARR/publications/CARRmagR&R25-Rothstein.pdf.
Accessed 29 September 2014
Rothstein H, Huber M, Gaskell G (2006) A theory of risk colonisation: the spiralling
regulatory logics of societal and institutional risk. Econ Soc 35(1):91–112,
February 2006
Rothstein H, Borraz O, Huber M (2012) Risk and the limits of governance:
Exploring varied patterns of risk-based governance across Europe. Regulation
and Governance 7:1–21. doi:10.111/j.1748-5991.2012.01153.x
Royal Society of New Zealand (2012) Code of Professional Standards and Ethics
http://www.royalsociety.org.nz/organisation/about/code/ Accessed 31
October 2014
Scolobig A, Mechler R, Komendantova N, Schröter D, Patt A (2014) The co-production
of scientific advice and decision making under uncertainty: Lessons from the
2009 L’Aquila Earthquake, Italy. GRF 2(2):71–6, Davos Planet@Risk
Siegrist M, Cvekovich G (2000) Perception of hazards: the role of social science
trust and knowledge. Risk Anal 20(5):713–9
Simoncini M (2011) Regulating catastrophic risks by standards, pp 37–50, EJRR 1/2011
Simoncini M (2013) Governing air traffic management in the single European sky:
The search for possible solutions to safety issues. European Law Review Issue
2(2013):209–28
Simoncini M (2014) When science meets responsibility – The Major Risk
Commission and the L’Aquila earthquake. EJRR 3(2):146–58
Sparks RSJ, Aspinall WP (2004) Volcanic activity: frontiers and challenges in
forecasting, prediction and risk assessment the state of the planet: frontiers
and challenges in geophysics. geophysical monograph 150. IUGG 19:359–73,
The International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and the American
Geophysical Union
Thompson MA, Lindsay JM, Gaillard JC (2015) The influence of probabilistic
volcanic hazard map properties on hazard communication. J Appl Volcanol
4:6. doi:10.1186/s13617-015-0023-0
Trujillo C (2013) Chile: State to pay damages for handling of 2010 earthquake
and tsunami, The Argentina Independent website published on 20/12/2013,
Accessed 29 September 2014
UN SC-DRR (2009) Lessons Learned: Disaster Management Legal Reform – The
Indonesian Experience. UND, Jakarta, Indonesia
United Kingdom Office for Nuclear Regulation (2013) Guidance for the demonstration
of ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) NS-TAST-GD-005 Revision 6
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster UN/ISDR (2015) Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 30th edn
Vilnes v Norway (2013) Application 52806/09, 22703/10), ECHR 52806/09
Wachinger G, Renn O, Begg C, Kuhlicke C (2013) The risk perception Paradox –
Implications for governance and communication of natural hazards. Risk Anal
33(6):1049–65. doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01942.x
Walker G, Whittle R, Medd W, Watson N (2010) Risk Governance and natural
hazards, Cap Haz-Net WP2 Report. Lancaster Environment Centre, Lancaster
University, Lancaster, http://caphaz-net.org/outcomess-results
Wilkinson E (2013) Disaster risk governance in volcanic areas – A concept note
from Work Package 4 of the Strengthening Resilience in Volcanic areas
(STEVA) programme. Overseas Development Institute, London
Wolman D (2014) The Aftershocks –Seven of Italy’s top scientists were convicted
of manslaughter following a catastrophic quake. Has the country criminalised
science?, https://medium.com/matter/the-aftershocks-7966d0cdec66
Woo G (2010) Seismol Res Lett 81(5):778–82. doi:10.1785.gssrl.81.5.778
Woo G (2011) Calculating Catastrophe. Imperial College Press, London
Woo G (2015) Counterfactual Disaster Analysis. University of Bristol, UK,
23 January 2015
World Health Organisation (2008) Implementation manual surgical checklist (First
Edition) Safe surgery saves lives. www.who.int/patientsafety/challenge/
safe.surgery/en/WHO. Geneva, Switzerland
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2015) 4:18 Page 24 of 24
